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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Trust Code [hereinafter UTC] will become "the first
national codification of the law of trusts"1 as it is enacted by state
legislatures. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws [hereinafter NCCUSLI is the body responsible for the
drafting of the UTC. The UTC is available in Volume 7C (Business
and Financial Laws) of the Uniform Laws Annotated (West Group)
and online at the University of Pennsylvania web site.2 The UTC is
also reproduced in the study report of the Nebraska Unicameral Leg-
islature, Comments and Recommendations For Enactment of a Ne-
braska Uniform Trust Code, LR 367, December 2002 [hereinafter
Report] .3
1. Uniform Trust Code (2000), Prefatory Note. The Nebraska enactment is based on
the Uniform Trust Code (2000), "Last Revised or Amended in 2001," bearing a
publication date of February 15, 2002. The references in this article are to that
published version of the Code. See David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code
(2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 Mo. L. REV. 143 (2002). See
also William J. Lindsay, Jr., The Nebraska Uniform Trust Code from the
Trenches: A Practitioner's Guide to Understanding Nebraska's New Uniform
Trust Code, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. - (2003); Ronald R. Volkmer, The Nebraska
Uniform Trust Code: Nebraska Trust Law in Transition, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV.
.-(2003).
2. Http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm.
3. The Report includes the official text of the Uniform Trust Code with Prefatory
Note and Comments, annotated with an analysis of each UTC section containing
a brief general statement of current Nebraska law, UTC provisions that appear
to reflect current Nebraska law, UTC provisions that appear to change current
Nebraska law, UTC provisions that appear to provide rules where there is no
clear current Nebraska law, Nebraska statutes to be amended, Nebraska stat-
utes to be repealed, and, finally, UTC provisions that the study group recom-
mended to be amended in the Nebraska enactment. The Report can be found
online at http://www.nebar.com/trustcode/barhome.htm. The amendments and
repeals of existing Nebraska statutes are clearly shown in the final reading and
slip law versions of LB 130 (2003), which can be found at http://
www.unicam.state.ne.us/. Amendments to LB 130 by the Legislature in the en-
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The UTC applies "to express trusts, charitable4 or noncharitable,
and trusts created pursuant to a statute, judgment, or decree that re-
quires the trust to be administered in the manner of an express
trust."5 The UTC becomes "operative" in Nebraska on January 1,
2005.6
The UTC applies generally to "all trusts" in existence on its opera-
tive date. UTC section 1106 provides: 7
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this [Code],8 on [the effective
date of this [Code]]:
(1) this [Code] applies to all trusts created before, on, or after
[its effective date];
(2) this [Code] applies to all judicial proceedings concerning
trusts commenced on or after [its effective date];
(3) this [Code] applies to judicial proceedings concerning trusts
commenced before [its effective date] unless the court finds
that application of a particular provision of this [Code]
would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of
the judicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the par-
ties, in which case the particular provision of this [Code]
does not apply and the superseded law applies;
(4) any rule of construction or presumption provided in this
[Code] applies to trust instruments executed before [the ef-
fective date of the [Code]] unless there is a clear indication
of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust; and
actment of the UTC are set out in Memo of William A. Marienau, Legal Counsel
of the Banking, Commerce & Insurance Committee, April 2003, in the official
Committee files on LB 130 (2003) [hereinafter Memo of William A. Marienau].
4. UTC section 103(3) defines the term "charitable trust" as "a trust, or portion of a
trust, created for a charitable purpose described in [UTC] Section 405(a)." (em-
phasis added) NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(3) (Supp. 2003).
5. UTC § 102; NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3802 (Supp. 2003).
6. LB 130 98th Legis., 1st Sess. § 140 (Neb. 2003) ("This act becomes operative on
the second January 1 following the effective date of this act."). LB 130 section
140 will not appear in the Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, but each section
of the statutes to which it is applicable will carry a notation that it becomes oper-
ative January 1, 2005. The effective date of LB 130 is August 31, 2003. The
operative date of the provisions contained in LB 130 is January 1, 2005.
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110 (Supp. 2003). The Nebraska UTC adds:
(c) Any reference to the powers authorized under the Nebraska Trust-
ees' Powers Act as such act existed prior to the operative date of this act
is deemed to be a reference to the powers authorized under the Nebraska
Uniform Trust Code.
8. See UTC § 602(a) (presumption that a trust is revocable); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
3854(a) (Supp. 2003). Nebraska also made the provisions of UTC sections
813(b)(2) and (3) (notice to qualified beneficiaries by trustee accepting trusteeship
on creation of an irrevocable trust or when a previously revocable trust becomes
irrevocable) effective on or after the operative date of the Nebraska UTC. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-3878(f) (Supp. 2003).
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(5) an act done before [the effective date of the [Code]] is not
affected by this [Code].
(b) If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expira-
tion of a prescribed period that has commenced to run under
any other statute before [the effective date of the [Code]], that
statute continues to apply to the right even if it has been re-
pealed or superseded.
Apparently the UTC drafters decided, as a general rule, to make
the UTC applicable to preexisting trusts to avoid having two complete
sets of trust rules in effect at the same time.9 There are sound policy
reasons for applying the UTC to trusts created before its effective
date: the nature of the substantive, procedural, and administrative
improvements in trust law; the complexity generated by having two
bodies of trust law; and the relative ease with which issues involving
the application of the UTC rules to preexisting trusts can be resolved.
All but one of the five states that have adopted the UTC have reached
the same conclusion. Arizona,1o Kansas," Nebraska,12 and New
Mexico 13 have enacted the language of UTC section 1106(a). To date,
only Wyoming14 has omitted the language of UTC section 1106(a).
9. The drafters' only statement about the decision to make the UTC applicable to
preexisting trusts appears in the Comment to UTC section 1106: "By applying
the Code to preexisting trusts, the need to know two bodies of law will quickly
lessen." Notwithstanding the drafters' assertion about the effect of applying the
UTC to preexisting trusts, there will continue to be a need to have substantial
knowledge of two bodies of trust law. As discussed in this article, some provisions
of current law will need to be considered with respect to preexisting trusts, par-
ticularly in the determination of the settlor's intent and in the basic determina-
tions of whether or not provisions of the UTC, rather than the previous law, are
applicable to the situation. And in states which have changed their versions of
the Rule Against Perpetuities to permit so called "dynasty trusts," see, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-2005(9) (Cum. Supp. 2002), there will be lengthy periods during
which preexisting trusts will be subject to some portions of the former rules and
some portions of the UTC. The UTC eliminates having two complete sets of trust
rules in effect at the same time, but it only reduces the scope of the former law
which will continue to apply to preexisting trusts subject to that state's trust law.
10. Act of May 12, 2003, ch. 212, § 16, 2003 Ariz. Sess. Laws S.B. 1351 (LEXIS
through 2003 legislation).
11. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58a-1106 (2002).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110 (Supp. 2003).
13. Act of April 2, 2003, ch. 122, § 11-1104, 2003 N. M. Laws H.B. 48 (LEXIS).
14. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1103 (2003). The Wyoming enactment provides:
(c) This act applies to a trust created before July 1, 2003 if the settlor, if
living, and all qualified beneficiaries consent to the application. If the
settlor is not living, this act may apply to a trust created before July 1,
2003 if all qualified beneficiaries consent to the application. If all of the
qualified beneficiaries do not consent to a proposed application of this act
to the trust, the court may apply this act to the trust after determining
that the interests of the nonconsenting qualified beneficiary will be ade-
quately protected.
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Although there are sound practical and policy reasons for avoiding
having two sets of trust rules in effect at the same time, it is not con-
stitutionally possible to avoid this result entirely. As the drafters rec-
ognize in the Prefatory Note and Comments 15 to the UTC, there are
additional constitutional limitations on the applicability of UTC sec-
tion 1106. The Prefatory Note to the UTC states that "The Uniform
Trust Code is intended to have the widest possible application, consis-
tent with constitutional limitations."16 The Comment to UTC sec-
tionll06 repeats this statement1 7 and adds: "The Code cannot be fully
retroactive, however. Constitutional limitations preclude application
of rules of construction to alter property rights under trusts that be-
came irrevocable prior to the effective date."1s
Further, the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code [hereinafter Nebraska
UTC] cannot displace the constitutional equity jurisdiction of Ne-
braska district courts. 19 It is not intended to restrict "the traditional
broad equitable jurisdiction of the court."20 There will continue to be
a body of Nebraska judicial trust law to be integrated with the new
statutory code.
Each application of the Nebraska UTC to a preexisting trust will
need to be examined for potential limitations on retroactivity. The ex-
amination will include a determination of whether or not the Ne-
braska UTC changes prior Nebraska law, and, if so, whether it alters
beneficial interests under trusts that became irrevocable before Janu-
ary 1, 2005; an interpretation and application of the transitional rules
in UTC section 1106; federal and state constitutional requirements
concerning retroactive state legislation; and, if necessary, Nebraska
constitutional requirements affecting litigation of these constitutional
questions.
The drafters of the UTC did not attempt to identify the additional
potential federal or state constitutional limits on the retroactive appli-
cation of the UTC. Instead, the drafters left the fine tuning of the
retroactive application of the UTC to the parties, practitioners and the
courts. As a result, there will be for some time a "gray zone" in which
possible federal and state constitutional limitations on the application
of the Nebraska UTC to preexisting trusts will require careful exami-
nation. Although this "gray zone" will exist, as a practical matter
15. Following each section of the UTC, the drafters have provided a Comment ex-
plaining and analyzing the section. In this article, when we refer to a Comment
we use the following citation form: Comment, UTC § 1106.
16. UTC Prefatory Note, Overview of Uniform Trust Code, Article 11- Miscellaneous
Provisions.
17. "The Uniform Trust Code is intended to have the widest possible effect within
constitutional limitations." Comment, UTC § 1106.
18. Comment, UTC § 1106.
19. Discussed in Part VIII of this article, infra.
20. Comment, UTC § 106.
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there should be few disputes over the retroactive application of the
UTC. Such disputes should be relatively easy to identify because they
will relate to beneficial interests and may lend themselves to settle-
ment rather than judicial resolution.2 1 An understanding of the prac-
tical aspects of the "gray zone" will facilitate a smooth and effective
implementation of the Nebraska UTC.
II. GENERAL APPLICABILITY TO TRUSTS CREATED BEFORE
JANUARY 1, 2005
A. Scope of Retroactive Applicatoin
UTC section 102 provides that the UTC "applies to express trusts,
charitable or noncharitable, and trusts created pursuant to a statute,
judgment, or decree that requires the trust to be administered in the
manner of an express trust."22 The drafters of the UTC intend the
UTC "to have the widest possible effect within constitutional limita-
tions."23 UTC section 1106(a)(1) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this [Code], on [the effective date of this [Code]]: (1) this
[Code] applies to all trusts created 24 before, on, or after [its effective
date] .. ."25 The Nebraska UTC becomes operative2 6 on January 1,
2005, at which time it will apply to all trusts described in UTC section
102, whether revocable or irrevocable, and whether written or oral,2 7
in existence on that date. There are several statutory exceptions to
the retroactive application of the Nebraska UTC.28 In addition to the
21. In some situations, ifjudicial resolution is necessary due to a lack of clarity in the
applicable prior law, it may be possible for the court to resolve the issue under its
constitutional equity jurisdiction rather than under the Nebraska UTC. See, for
example, the discussion of equitable deviation under UTC section 412(a) with re-
spect to dispositive provisions in private express trusts, in text beginning infra at
note 233.
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3802 (Supp. 2003).
23. Comment, UTC § 1106.
24. UTC section 402 sets forth the requirements for creation of a trust.
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(1) (Supp. 2003), the Nebraska equivalent of UTC
section 1106(a)(1), provides: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in the Nebraska
Uniform Trust Code, on the operative date of this act: (1) the code applies to all
trusts created before, on, or after the operative date of this act ..
26. See supra note 6.
27. See UTC § 407 ("[T~he creation of an oral trust and its terms may be established
only by clear and convincing evidence."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3833 (Supp. 2003)
("[T]he creation of an oral trust and its terms, or an amendment or revocation of
an oral trust may be established only by clear and convincing evidence.").
28. The statutory exceptions are:
1. UTC section 602(a), which provides that "[u]nless the terms of a trust
expressly provide that the trust is irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or
amend the trust," applies only prospectively. "IIUTC section 602(a)] does
not apply to a trust created under an instrument executed before [the
effective date of this [Code]]." UTC § 602(a) (second sentence), NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-3854(a) (Supp. 2003) (second sentence). The language "trust
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statutory exceptions to retroactive application of the UTC, there are,
as we explain in the following section, possible federal and Nebraska
constitutional limitations to retroactive application of the UTC.
B. Constitutional Limitations
Enactment of the UTC is subject to federal and state constitutional
limitations on state legislation having retroactive implications. Al-
though the UTC contains no language pertaining expressly to poten-
tial constitutional implications, terse references to constitutional
limitations appear in the Overview of the UTC29 and in the Comment
to UTC section 1106.30 In all probability, these terse references re-
created under an instrument executed before" would appear to apply to
revocable trusts "created" before the effective date which become irrevo-
cable after the effective date and to trusts created under wills "executed
before" the effective date of the UTC by decedents who die after the effec-
tive date.
2. Nebraska UTC section 813(f), a nonuniform provision clarifying that
the notice requirements imposed by UTC sections 813(b)(2) and (3) on
trustees apply only to trustees of trusts that became irrevocable on or
after January 1, 2005. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3878(f) (Supp. 2003).
3. UTC section 1106(a)(2), which provides that the UTC "applies to all
judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on after [its effective
date]." UTC § 1106(a)(2), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(2) (Supp.
2003).
4. UTC section 1106(a)(3), which provides that the UTC "applies to judi-
cial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before [its effective date]
unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of this
[Code] would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the ju-
dicial proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the
particular provision of this [Code] does not apply and the superseded law
applies ... " UTC § 1106(a)(4), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(3) (Supp.
2003).
5. UTC section 1106(a)(4), which provides that "any rule of construction
or presumption provided in this [Code] applies to trust instruments exe-
cuted before [the effective date of the [Code]] unless there is a clear indi-
cation of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust . . . ." UTC
§ 1106(a)(4), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(4) (Supp. 2003).
6. UTC section 1106(a)(5), which provides that "an act done before [the
effective date of the [Code]] is not affected by this [Code]." UTC
§ 1106(a)(5), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(5) (Supp. 2003).
7. UTC section 1106(b), which provides that "[i]f a right is acquired,
extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that
has commenced to run under any other statute before [the effective date
of the [Code]], that statute continues to apply to the right even if it has
been repealed or superseded." UTC § 1106(b), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
38,110(b) (Supp. 2003).
29. See Prefatory Note, Overview of Uniform Trust Code, Article 11- Miscellaneous
Provisions:
The Uniform Trust Code is intended to have the widest possible applica-
tion, consistent with constitutional limitations. The Code applies not
only to trusts created on or after the effective date, but also to trusts in
existence on the date of enactment.
30. Comment, UTC § 1106:
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flect the drafters' concerns about possible Federal and state constitu-
tional limitations on the application of the UTC to preexisting
irrevocable trusts. In addition, we must consider the application of
the Nebraska UTC in the context of the Nebraska Constitution's grant
of equity jurisdiction to the courts3 1 and, if constitutional issues are
involved in litigation under the Nebraska UTC, in light of special Ne-
braska procedural requirements concerning their judicial resolution.3 2
It is only with respect to trusts that have become irrevocable before
its operative date that the UTC cannot constitutionally be "fully retro-
active."3 3 A revocable trust is one "revocable by the settlor without
the consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest."34
Because the Nebraska UTC does not become operative until January
1, 2005,35 there is ample time to satisfy any due process requirements
concerning notice of changes in substantive law as they might be ap-
plicable to revocable trusts that become irrevocable on or after the op-
erative date of the Nebraska UTC.36 Assume, for example, that the
settlor of a revocable trust died on the operative date of the Nebraska
UTC, January 1, 2005, that creditors sought to secure payment under
UTC section 505(a)(3) 3 7 from the trust assets, that such claims
The Uniform Trust Code is intended to have the widest possible effect
within constitutional limitations. Specifically, the Code applies to all
trusts whenever created, to the judicial proceedings concerning trusts
commenced on or after its effective date, and unless the court otherwise
orders, to judicial proceedings in progress on the effective date. In addi-
tion, any rules of construction or presumption provided in the Code ap-
ply to preexisting trusts unless there is a clear indication of a contrary
intent in the trust's terms. By applying the Code to preexisting trusts,
the need to know two bodies of law will quickly lessen.
The Code cannot be fully retroactive, however. Constitutional limita-
tions preclude retroactive application of rules of construction to alter
property rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the effec-
tive date. Also, rights already barred by a statute of limitation or rule
under former law are not revived by a possibly longer statute or more
liberal rule under this Code. Nor is an act done before the effective date
of the Code affected by the Code's enactment.
31. Discussed in Part VIII of this article, infra.
32. Discussed in Part IX of this article, infra.
33. See Comment, UTC § 1106.
34. See UTC § 103(13); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(14) (Supp. 2003). UTC section
603(a) provides that so long as the trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity
to revoke the trust, the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to the settlor.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3855(a) (Supp. 2003). The requirement of capacity to re-
voke the trust in this situation changes Nebraska law. See Report, supra note 3
at 185-86.
35. See supra note 6.
36. See discussion in Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Ass'n, 255 Neb. 977, 588 N.W.2d
565 (1999) (Nebraska legislature may shorten a limitation period for commence-
ment of a cause of action, and the change may be made applicable to existing
claims, so long as a reasonable time is allowed to bring such action).
37. UTC section 505(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
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against revocable trust assets were not authorized under prior law, 38
and that absent ability to reach the trust assets the creditors would
collect nothing. There would be little doubt that the Nebraska UTC
provisions could constitutionally be applied since they were not ap-
plied retroactively. 3 9
Even as to preexisting irrevocable trusts, the UTC is "primarily a
default statute."40 Constitutional issues will arise only if a UTC de-
fault rule applies because the settlor has not "otherwise provided in
the terms of the trust"41 or because the UTC rule is one which the
terms of the trust cannot override.42
Nebraska law, like that of most or all states, is nebulous and spec-
ulative concerning potential constitutional limits on the retroactive
application of the UTC to preexisting irrevocable trusts. The most fre-
quently stated Nebraska rule is that a legislative act will not be per-
mitted to operate retroactively where it invalidates or impairs
contractual obligations or interferes with vested rights.43 But this
language does not fit well with respect to trusts and trust law. The
relationships among the settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries are not con-
tractual in an ordinary sense. The term "vested right" is especially
confusing as applied to a preexisting irrevocable trust since one princi-
ple of sound trust planning is to avoid establishing the sort of descend-
able, inheritable interests which are considered "vested" under normal
property law rules. The difficulty in applying a "vested rights" analy-
sis in this context becomes clear when we realize that, in one sense,
the total sum of the beneficial interests in a trust is "vested" in the
group of beneficiaries. Thus, whatever changes the beneficial inter-
ests existing in an irrevocable trust when the UTC becomes operative
"interferes with vested rights" in a constitutional sense.
(3) After the death of a settlor, and subject to the settlor's right to direct
the source from which liabilities will be paid, the property of a trust that
was revocable at the settlor's death is subject to claims of the settlor's
creditors ....
38. There was no prior law on this issue in Nebraska and a split of authority in other
jurisdictions. See Report, supra note 3 at 162. The Nebraska enactment adopts
the provisions of UTC section 505(a)(3) and provides procedures to assert the
claims. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3850(a)(3) (Supp. 2003).
39. The Nebraska Legislature avoided possible questions of retroactive application of
the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code by providing that it applied only to wills of
decedents dying after the operative date of the statute. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
2901(b)(1) (Reissue 1995).
40. Comment, UTC § 105.
41. UTC § 105(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(a) (Supp. 2003).
42. UTC § 105(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b) (Supp. 2003).
43. See, e.g., City of Lincoln v. Bruce, 221 Neb. 61, 375 N.W.2d 118 (1985); Dell v.
City of Lincoln, 170 Neb. 176, 102 N.W.2d 62 (1960); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ohler,
119 Neb. 121, 227 N.W. 449 (1929).
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Nebraska decisions have also used different criteria in evaluating
retroactive legislation. One statement is that the determination "gen-
erally depends upon reasonableness": 44
Constitutionality of a retroactive statute under the contract and due pro-
cess clauses generally depends upon reasonableness. Relevant factors are the
nature and strength of the public interest, the extent of modification of the
asserted preenactment right, and the nature of the right altered by the stat-
ute .... [citations omitted] "The boundary at which the conflicting interests
balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points
in the line * * * are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on
the nearer or farther side." Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349, 355, 28 S. Ct. 529, 531, 52 L. Ed. 828 (1908).
There is also a substantial line of Nebraska zoning ordinance cases
which focus on good faith reliance upon the previous zoning ordinance
as establishing a basis for "vested rights" entitled to protection
against retroactive legislation.45 These cases offer the following
rationale:46
Thus, a landowner has no vested right in the continuity of zoning in a par-
ticular area so as to preclude subsequent amendment, and a zoning regulation
may be retroactively applied to deny an application for a building permit even
though the permit could lawfully have issued at the time of application....
[citations omitted]
Nonetheless, a new zoning ordinance will not have retroactive effect where
an applicant has substantially changed position in good-faith reliance upon
the existing zoning by causing substantial construction to be made or by in-
curring substantial expenses related to construction .... [citations omitted]
This substantial reliance exception is basically an application of the rule that
a zoning ordinance may not, without providing a reasonable plan for discon-
tinuance, operate retroactively to deprive a property owner of previously
vested rights by preventing a use to which the property was put before enact-
ment of the prohibitory ordinance.
44. Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786, 790, 186 N.W.2d 904,
906 (1971) (statute extinguishing possibilities of reverter after 30 years held con-
stitutional). See Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 842-843, 272 N.W.2d 768,
772-773 (1978) (statute providing that severed mineral interests, considered
vested property rights, are abandoned if the record owner has not exercised pub-
licly a right of ownership for 23 years, or judicially asserted a claim within two
years of the enactment, held "unconstitutional as violative of the due process and
contract clauses of the United States and the Nebraska Constitutions" insofar as
it operated retroactively).
45. See, e.g., Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 234 Neb. 527, 451 N.W.2d 702
(1990); Omaha Fish and Wildlife Club, Inc. v. Comty. Refuse Disposal, Inc., 213
Neb. 234, 329 N.W.2d 335 (1983); A.C. Nelsen Enter., Inc. v. Cook, 188 Neb. 184,
195 N.W.2d 759 (1972); Saunders County v. Moore, 182 Neb. 377, 155 N.W.2d
317 (1967); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sarpy County v. Petsch, 172 Neb. 263, 109
N.W.2d 388 (1961); City of Omaha v. Glissman, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W.2d 828
(1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 960, 70 S. Ct. 1002, 94 L. Ed. 1370 (1950);
Cassell Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 753, 14 N.W.2d 600 (1944).
46. Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 234 Neb. 527, 532-33, 451 N.W.2d 702, 706
(1990). See also cases cited supra note 45.
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Nebraska is not unusual in its jumbled and confusing rules con-
cerning the constitutional limitations on retroactive state statutes. As
one commentator notes:4 7
Judicial opinions are full of standards which purport to govern decision
concerning the legality of retroactive application of new law. On close exami-
nation most of them turn out to be little more than ways to restate the prob-
lem. Probably the most hackneyed example of such a rule is to the effect that
a law cannot be retroactively applied to impair vested rights. But the state-
ment of that proposition does nothing more than focus attention on the ques-
tion concerning what circumstances qualify a right to be characterized as
"vested." A most natural definition of the term "vested" is "accrued" or, as
dictionaries put it, "completed and consummated." But in that sense, any
claim or interest which has come into being and been perfected as a "right"
would have to be said to be vested. This makes it clear that the formulation
which uses "vested" as the basis for deciding the legality of retroactivity has to
be using that concept in a more specialized sense than its ordinary and usual
one.... The superficiality and inconclusive nature of most of these formula-
tions make it necessary, or at least desirable, to search for more meaningful
guidelines with which to make judgments about the fairness or unfairness of
applying a new law to alter legal interests from what they had previously
been.
Analysis of the practical considerations influencing the question whether a
retroactive application of a new law is fair and just should afford more mean-
ingful standards of judgment than either catchpenny phrases or the ambiva-
lent concept of "vested."...
One of the fundamental considerations of fairness recognized in every legal
system is that settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect to sub-
stantial interests ought not to be defeated. There is evidence that results
achieved through application of judicial instinct, manifested in the pattern of
decisions on retroactivity problems, are perhaps best explained in terms of
this fundamental principle of justice.
The focus of an analysis of constitutional issues concerning retroac-
tivity of the UTC should be on whether provisions operate in a manner
that alters beneficial interests in an irrevocable trust. UTC provisions
that relate only to trust administration and are not directed toward
beneficial interests should not raise constitutional retroactivity issues.
The principle that the focus of constitutional analysis relating to retro-
active application of the UTC should be on alteration of beneficial in-
terests in irrevocable trusts finds support in the Comment to UTC
section 1106(a)(4). UTC section 1106(a)(4), discussed later in this arti-
cle,4 s provides for retroactive application of "any rule of construction
or presumption provided in this [Code] ... unless there is a clear indi-
cation of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust."4 9 The Comment
to UTC section 1106 observes without additional explanation or refer-
47. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.5, at 414-415
(6th ed. 2002).
48. The development of the Comment to UTC section 1106(a)(4) by its drafters is
discussed in section II.C of this article, infra. The discussion of Rules of Con-
struction is in section IV.B, infra.
49. UTC § 1106(a)(4), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(4) (Supp. 2003).
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ence to other sources: "Constitutional limitations preclude retroactive
application of rules of construction to alter property rights under
trusts that became irrevocable prior to the effective date."5 0 The UTC
defines the term "property" to mean "anything that may be the subject
of ownership, whether real or personal, legal or equitable, or any in-
terest therein."51 The term "interests of the beneficiaries" as used in
the UTC "means the beneficial interests provided in the terms of the
trust."5 2 The term "beneficiary" includes a person that "has a present
or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent."53 And
the UTC provides "default" rules which govern "the rights and inter-
ests of a beneficiary." 54 The apparent purpose of the Comment to
UTC section 1106 is to make clear that the drafters were concerned
that beneficial interests under trusts that were or had become irrevo-
cable prior to the operative date of the UTC could not constitutionally
be altered by application of the new rules of the UTC.
Past enactments of uniform legislation relating to trusts and pro-
bate provide additional support for the principle that the focus of con-
stitutional analysis relating to retroactive application of the UTC
should be on alteration of beneficial interests in irrevocable trusts.
Such legislation has dealt largely with trust administration and judi-
cial procedures. These statutes have expressly covered trusts estab-
lished before their enactment, have applied to transactions after
enactment, and have not been subject to constitutional inquiry on the
basis of retroactivity. Nebraska's enactments in recent years of the
Nebraska Trustees' Powers Act, 5 5 Nebraska Uniform Prudent Inves-
tor Act,5 6 Uniform Principal and Income Act,57 and the provisions on
50. There are no references to other authorities on this issue in the Comments to
UTC sections 1106 or 112.
51. UTC § 103(11); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(11) (Supp. 2003). The term "property
right" does not appear elsewhere in the UTC or Comments.
52. UTC § 103(7); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(7) (Supp. 2003).
53. UTC § 103(2)(A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(2)(A) (Supp. 2003).
54. UTC § 105(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(a) (Supp. 2003).
55. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2825 (Reissue 1995) ("except as specifically provided in the
trust instrument").
56. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-2212 (Reissue 1997) ("the act governs only decisions or ac-
tions occurring after that date"). For older cases from other jurisdictions, see V.
Woerner, Annotation, Retrospective Application of Statutes Relating to Trust In-
vestments, 35 A.L.R.2d 991 (1954).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3149 (Cum. Supp. 2002) ("except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided in the will or terms of the trust or in the act"). An earlier enactment in
1980 also applied to previously established trusts. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3114
(Reissue 1995). For older cases from other jurisdictions, see E. H. Schopler, An-
notation, Constitutionality of Retrospective Application of Uniform Principal and
Income Act or Other Statutes Relating to Ascertainment of Principal and Income
and Apportionment of Receipts and Expenses Among Life Tenants and Remain-
dermen, 69 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1960).
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trust administration in the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code58 have
been applied to previously established trusts without apparent
difficulty.
In Nebraska, legislation affecting beneficial interests in trusts has
been applied prospectively. The substantive provisions of the Ne-
braska Uniform Probate Code enacted in 1974 applied only to wills of
decedents dying after its operative date, January 1, 1977.59 The Uni-
form Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act applies prospectively to
"a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is cre-
ated on or after" the effective date of the statute.6O Further, a court
"may reform the disposition [of a trust created before the effective
date] in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor's
manifested plan of distribution and is within the limits of the rule
against perpetuities applicable when the nonvested property interest
or power of appointment was created."6 1 Nebraska's "dynasty trust"
provisions also apply prospectively. 62 The Uniform Testamentary Ad-
ditions to Trusts Act (1991),63 as well as its predecessor which was
part of the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code,64 applies only to a will of
a testator who dies after the operative date of the statute.
C. Evolution of UTC Section 1106 and its Comment
The evolution of UTC section 1106 and its explanatory Comment
illustrates that its drafters were concerned with the constitutional im-
plications of the retroactive effects on beneficial interests under irrev-
ocable trusts. The final version of the Comment was written only
after the UTC was approved at the 2000 Annual Conference Meeting
of NCCUSL.65
Early drafts of the transitional provisions contained an effective
date, language that "on and after the effective date, this [Act] applies
to all trusts regardless of whether they were created before, on, or af-
ter its effective date," and subsections on judicial proceedings com-
58. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2801 to 30-2818 (Reissue 1995) ("Article 28, Trust
Administration").
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2901(b)(1) (Reissue 1995). Further, the Nebraska adoption
omitted a subsection relating to retroactive application of rules of construction
which might have had an effect on beneficial trust interests. See discussion in
text following note 129, infra.
60. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2006(a) (Reissue 1996) ("For the purposes of this section, a
nonvested property interest or a power of appointment created by the exercise of
a power of appointment is created when the power is irrevocably exercised or
when a revocable exercise becomes irrevocable.").
61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2006(b) (Reissue 1996).
62. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2005(9) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3603 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
64. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2336 (Reissue 1995).
65. See text beginning infra at note 77.
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menced before and after the effective date.66 The Comment stated:
"This section provides the general rule governing application of this
Act to administration of existing trusts and pending proceedings in-
volving trusts. For a comparable provision, see Section 8-101 of the
Uniform Probate Code."67
The next draft version added what became UTC section 1106(a)(4)
on rules of construction and presumptions, language that "an act done
before the effective date in any proceeding and any accrued right is
not impaired by this [Act]," and language which became UTC section
1106(b) on statutes of limitations.68 The language on "an act done
before the effective date" was the same as the Uniform Probate Code
section 8-101:69 "an act done before the operative date in any proceed-
ing and any accrued right is not impaired by this code." The Comment
to the UTC draft stated:70
This section addresses the applicability of the Act, including application to
pending judicial proceedings and the administration of existing trusts. The
Act is intended to receive the widest possible application. The Act applies to
all trusts subject to the jurisdiction of the enacting state, whether created
before or after the date of enactment. But recognizing constitutional concerns,
excluded from coverage are trusts created prior to the Act's effective date if
such application would impair a vested right. For such an impairment to oc-
cur, however, the trust would have to be irrevocable as of the effective date
and the particular provision of the Act would have to actually reduce or other-
wise threaten a beneficial interest.
The text of the drafts and supporting Comment remained the same
through the next three published versions of the UTC.71 A November
1999 Meeting Memo of the UTC Committee Reporter, dated October
21, 1999, states:72
The ABA Task Force concludes that the effective date provisions need clarifi-
cation. The key issue is the retroactive application of rules of construction.
Currently, under this section the sole limitation on retroactive application of
rules of construction is the statement that "any accrued right" is not affected
by this Act. The comment then explains that this means that rules of con-
struction apply to all trusts except for trusts which were irrevocable on effec-
tive date and where particular provision of Act would reduce or threaten a
beneficial interest. Should this statement in the comment be made more pre-
cise and then moved into the statute? Also, to what extent should rules of
66. Drafts of June 6, 1996, § 6-101; October 21, 1996, § 7-101; and January 24, 1997,
§ 7-101.
67. Id.
68. Draft of October 13, 1997, § 7-101.
69. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2901(b)(4) (Reissue 1995).
70. Draft of October 13, 1997, Comment on § 7-101.
71. Drafts of January 12, 1998, § 7-101; 1999 Annual Meeting Draft, § 1105; October
1999 Draft, § 1105.
72. Memo from David English, Reporter, to Commissioners, Advisors, Observers,
Drafting Committee on Uniform Trust Act, October 21, 1999, Re: November
Meeting, Section 1105, Application to Existing Relationship, NCCUSL Official
Site of Uniform and Model Acts, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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construction apply to settlors of revocable trusts and wills who were incapaci-
tated on the effective date of the Act and at all times thereafter?7 3
Two draft versions in the Spring of 200074 and the 2000 Annual
Meeting Draft75 omitted the words "in any proceeding and any ac-
crued right is not affected by this [Act]" in what became UTC section
1106(a)(5). The provision stated "an act done before [the effective date
of the [Code]] is not affected by this [Code]."76 The are a few varia-
tions between the language of the Comment in the 2000 Annual Meet-
ing Draft and the Comment which now appears in the final version.
The 2000 Annual Meeting Draft stated:77
This Code is intended to have the widest possible effect within constitutional
limitations. Specifically, this Code applies to all trusts whenever created, to
judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced on or after its effective
date, and to already existing judicial proceedings unless the court otherwise
orders. In addition, any rules of construction or presumption provided in the
Code apply to preexisting trusts unless there is a clear indication of a contrary
intent in the trust's terms. By giving the Code the widest possible retroactive
effect, the need to know two bodies of law will quickly lessen.
The Code is and cannot be fully retroactive, however. Constitutional limita-
tions preclude retroactive application to disturb settled property rights. Also,
rights already barred by a statute of limitation or rule under former law are
not revived by a possibly longer statute or more liberal rule under this Code.
Nor is an Act done before the effective date of the Code affected by the Code's
enactment. Finally the Code itself provides that certain of its provisions do
not apply to trust instruments executed before the effective date of the Code.
These include Sections 602(a) (presumption that a trust is revocable) and 813(/) (provision limiting ability of settlor to waive trustee's duty to report to bene-
ficiaries and keep them informed).
Following the Summer 2000 meeting of NCCUSL at which the
UTC was approved, the section was renumbered as UTC section
1106.78 The Final Act (2000) With Prefatory Note and Comments, is-
sued April 25, 2001, contains the final version of UTC section 1106
and Comment. The final Comment to UTC section 1106 is different
than the 2000 annual meeting version in several respects. The intro-
73. Neither the Code nor its commentary responds directly to the question "to what
extent should rules of construction apply to settlors of revocable trusts and wills
who were incapacitated on the effective date of the Act and at all times thereaf-
ter?" UTC section 103(17), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3803(18) (Supp. 2003), allows a
settlor's (which includes a testator's) intent to be "established by other evidence
that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding." The rules of presumptions,
interpretation and construction when the document was drawn should be pri-
mary, both despite and within the provisions of UTC section 1106(a)(4), Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-38,110(a)(4) (Supp. 2003). And, better yet, section 1106(a)(4) should be
removed from the Nebraska UTC as its ancestral model was removed from the
enactment of the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code in 1974.
74. Drafts of March 10, 2000, § 1101; April 14, 2000, § 1101.
75. 2000 Annual Meeting Draft, § 1105.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. 2000 Annual Meeting Act of October 9, 2000, Pre Final Style Version, § 1106.
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ductory words "By giving the Code the widest possible retroactive ef-
fect" were changed to "By applying the Code to preexisting trusts, the
need to know two bodies of law will quickly lessen." The sentence
"Constitutional limitations preclude retroactive application to disturb
settled property rights" was significantly changed to "Constitutional
limitations preclude retroactive application of rules of construction to
alter property rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the
effective date." The sentence "Finally, the Code itself provides that
certain of its provisions do not apply to trust instruments executed
before the effective date of the Code" was deleted. Instead, there is a
single reference to the presumption of revocability in UTC section
602(a).
The UTC drafters were aware of the general rules pertaining to
retroactive legislation affecting "vested interests." It is also clear that
there was a concern for provisions which might "reduce or otherwise
threaten a beneficial interest." Although there was a primary concern
for "the retroactive application of rules of construction to alter prop-
erty rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the effective
date," there were also other constitutional implications knowingly left
for the parties or the courts to resolve in specific situations.
D. Administrative Provisions
There are a variety of administrative provisions which the legisla-
tive study committee characterized as changes in Nebraska law.
These provisions can be applied after the operative date of the UTC to
irrevocable trusts created before the operative date. Changes in trust
administration by the Nebraska UTC which, in effect, will operate
prospectively with respect to preexisting irrevocable trusts include
UTC section 104(b) on notice "only from the time the information was
received by an employee having responsibility to act for the trust, or
would have been brought to the employee's attention if the organiza-
tion had exercised reasonable diligence";79 UTC section 108(c) al-
lowing transfers of the principal place of administration to a
jurisdiction outside of the United States;8 0 UTC section 109(c) al-
lowing "a properly directed electronic message" as a permissible
method of notice;8 ' UTC section 110(b) and (c) extending "the rights of
qualified beneficiaries" to certain "other" beneficiaries;82 UTC section
202(b) providing in personam Nebraska jurisdiction of recipients of
trust distributions;83 UTC Article 3 providing rules of representation
79. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3804(b) (Supp. 2003).
80. Id. § 30-3808(c).
81. Id. § 30-3809(a). The Report, supra note 3 at 44, also notes other changes in the
methods and waivers of notices.
82. Id. § 30-3810(b) and (c).
83. Id. § 30-3813(b).
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in nonjudicial situations;8 4 UTC section 405(c) allowing the settlor of a
charitable trust to maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust;8 5 UTC
section 410(b) allowing the settlor of a noncharitable irrevocable trust
to commence a proceeding to approve or disapprove a proposed modifi-
cation or termination under UTC section 411;86 UTC section 410(b)
allowing the settlor of a charitable trust to maintain a proceeding to
modify the trust under UTC section 413;87 UTC section 414(a) author-
izing a trustee to terminate an uneconomic trust;8 8 UTC section 417
authorizing a trustee to combine or divide two or more separate
trusts;8 9 UTC Article 7 in its entirety providing rules for the "office of
trustee";90 UTC section 802 defining the trustee's duty of loyalty
which generally specifies a higher standard;91 UTC section 804 which
broadens the prudent investor standard to cover other trust adminis-
tration activities of a trustee;9 2 UTC section 807 which has been incor-
porated into the prudent investor statutes to allow for the delegation
of "duties and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could
properly delegate under, the circumstances" and is not limited to in-
vestment and management functions;93 UTC section 808 allowing per-
sons other than the settlor to direct certain actions of the trustee,
including a power to direct the modification or termination of the
trust, and imposing a fiduciary responsibility upon such person;94
UTC section 810(d) allowing a trustee to "invest as a whole the prop-
erty of two or more separate trusts" without regard to whether the
trusts contain substantially similar provisions;9 5 UTC section 812 re-
quiring, rather than permitting, a successor trustee to compel a for-
mer trustee or other person to deliver trust property or to redress a
breach of trust;96 UTC section 813 specifying the trustee's duties to
inform and report to qualified beneficiaries and beneficiaries;9 7 UTC
section 816 replacing the former Nebraska Trustees' Powers Act;98
UTC section 817 providing procedures for trust termination or partial
termination;9 9 amendments to the Nebraska Prudent Investor Act in-
84. Id. §§ 30-3822 to 30-3826.
85. Id. § 30-3831(c).
86. Id. § 30-3836(b).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 30-3840(a).
89. Id. § 30-3843.
90. Id. §§ 30-3857 to 30-3865.
91. Id. § 30-3867.
92. Id. § 30-3869.
93. Id. § 30-3872 and 30-3888.
94. Id. § 30-3873.
95. Id. § 30-3875(d).
96. Id. § 30-3877.
97. Id. § 30-3878.
98. Id. § 30-3881.
99. Id. § 30-3882.
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corporated as Article 9 of the Uniform Trust Code;100 UTC section
1001 providing remedies for a breach of trust by a trustee (but the
fiduciary duty owed should be determined under the law at the time of
the alleged breach);l 0 1 and UTC section 1102 authorizing electronic
records and signatures. 0 2
III. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The UTC "applies to all judicial proceedings concerning trusts com-
menced on or after [its effective date]"' 03 and to "judicial proceedings
concerning trusts commenced before [its effective date] unless the
court finds that application of a particular provision of this [Code]
would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the judicial
proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties."104 These rules are
essentially the same rules the court would apply in the absence of
statutory directions on retroactivity.1 0 5  Substantive legislative
changes are generally not applicable to pending cases. Procedural leg-
islative changes are generally applicable to pending cases. Substan-
tive changes relate to "duties, rights and obligations." Procedural
changes relate to "the means and methods through and by which sub-
stantive laws are enforced and applied."' 06 The transitional rules con-
cerning judicial proceedings should raise no unusual issues under
Nebraska law. Legislation relating to county court jurisdiction of
trustees not specifically named in a will was procedural and applied to
trustees appointed before or after the enactment. 10 7
100. Id. §§ 30-3883 to 30-3889.
101. Id. § 30-3890. Recovery of the greater of the expectancy interest or the trustee
profits as damages under UTC section 1002 should also apply only to events after
the operative date of the UTC.
102. Id. § 30-38,109.
103. UTC § 1106(a)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(2) (Supp. 2003).
104. UTC § 1106(a)(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(3) (Supp. 2003). The Kansas
Supreme Court has applied the Kansas Uniform Trust Code to a judicial proceed-
ing commenced in 2002 involving a testamentary trust created in 1969. The Kan-
sas UTC became effective January 1, 2003. In the Matter of the John P. Harris
Testamentary Trust, 69 P.3d 1109, 1113 (Kan. 2003). Concluding that applica-
tion of the Kansas UTC "would not substantially interfere with the effective con-
duct of the judicial proceedings before this court or prejudice the rights of the
parties," id., the court explained that "[tihe facts are not in dispute, and all par-
ties have entered their appearances before the district court and requested that
the proposed changes be adopted and confirmed by this court." Id.
105. See In re Interest of Clifford M., 261 Neb. 862, 868, 626 N.W.2d 549, 556 (2001);
Kratochvil v. Motor Club Insurance, 255 Neb. 977, 983, 588 N.W.2d 565, 571
(1999); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 Neb. 32, 42-43, 582N.W.2d 291, 300 (1998).
106. See In re Interest of Clifford M., 261 Neb. at 868, 626 N.W.2d at 556 (citing Kra-
tochvil and Cheloha).
107. In re Greenamyre's Estate, 133 Neb. 693, 276 N.W. 686 (1937).
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Nebraska added language patterned upon the Nebraska Uniform
Probate CodelOS that each proceeding before the court is independent
of any other proceeding involving the same trust. 0 9 The main pur-
pose of this amendment was "to make clear when there is a 'final or-
der' for purposes of an appeal."1 1o
IV. Rules of Construction and Presumptions
UTC section 1106(a)(4)111 provides that "any rule of construc-
tion112 or presumption113 provided in this [Code] applies to trust in-
struments114 executed' 15 before [the effective date of the [Code]]
unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent in the terms of
the trust."116 This provision raises several important questions: (1)
What constitutes a "clear indication of a contrary intent"; (2) What are
the "rules of construction" to which this provision refers; (3) What are
the "presumptions" to which this provision refers; and (4) Are there
constitutional limitations on the retroactive application of these rules
to trusts created before the UTC became effective?
A. Clear indication of a Contrary Intent.
The phrase "clear indication of a contrary intent" should be given
an expansive interpretation, which includes consideration of the legal
rules and interpretations in effect at the time the instrument was pre-
pared, in its application to trusts created before the UTC's operative
108. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2407 (Reissue 1995) and 30-2209(35) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
109. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3814(c)-(f) (Supp. 2003).
110. See Memo of William A. Marienau, supra note 3.
111. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(4) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
112. UTC section 112 provides that "[tihe rules of construction that apply in this State
to the interpretation of and disposition of property by will also apply as appropri-
ate to the interpretation of the terms of a trust and the disposition of the trust
property." The Nebraska UTC does not include this provision.
113. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-301 (Reissue 1995) ("In all cases not otherwise provided
for by statute or by these rules a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is
more probable than its existence.").
114. The phase "trust instrument" means "an instrument executed by the settlor that
contains terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto." UTC § 103(18),
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(19) (Supp. 2003).
115. Note that UTC section 112 refers to trust instruments "executed" before the effec-
tive date in contrast to the language of UTC section 1106(a)(1) which applies to
"all trusts created" before the effective date.
116. UTC section 103(17), which defines the phrase "terms of a trust," answers a
threshold question by making it clear that we can look beyond the language of the
trust instrument to determine the settlor's intent: "'terms of a trust' means the
manifestation of the settlor's intent regarding a trust's provisions as expressed in
the trust instrument or as may be established by other evidence that would be
admissible in a judicial proceeding." NEB., REV. STAT. § 30-3803(18) (Supp. 2003)
(emphasis added).
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date. Ordinarily, the rules in effect at the inception of the trust are
utilized in the determination of the settlor's intent and the interpreta-
tion and application of the trust instrument. The definition of the
phrase "terms of a trust" allows a court to look to evidence of the set-
tlor's intent outside of the trust document "as may be established by
other evidence that could be admissible in a judicial proceeding."11 7
In the absence of direct statements by or to the settlor, the best evi-
dence of the settlor's intent may come from the rules of construction
and presumptions in place at the time of the creation of the trust. For
that reason, a court should look primarily to the rules which applied
when the settlor created the trust rather than to different rules con-
tained in subsequent legislation.
Suppose a settlor created an irrevocable trust in 1990 which in-
cluded a spendthrift provision applicable to all beneficiaries. In 2006,
after the settlor's death, the beneficiaries seek to terminate the trust
under UTC section 411(b)118 which allows a court to approve termina-
tion if "continuance of the trust is not necessary to achieve any mate-
rial purpose of the trust." In 1990, the well established rule was that
spendthrift protection was a material purpose of a trust.11 9 However,
UTC section 411(c) provides that "[a] spendthrift provision in the
terms of the trust is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of
the trust." Should the negative presumption of UTC section 411(c) ap-
ply rather than the clear rules in effect in 1990 when the trust was
created? Based on the language of UTC section 1106(a)(4), the answer
depends on whether there is a "clear indication of a contrary intent."
In making that determination, a court should give significant weight
to the fact that when the settlor created the trust spendthrift protec-
tion was considered a material purpose of the trust.12 0
To give any real meaning to the words "unless there is a clear indi-
cation of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust" (which by defini-
tion "means the manifestation of the settlor's intent regarding a
trust's provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be
established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial
proceeding"), we have to place ourselves in the context in which the
trust was created. It may be proper policy for legislation prospectively
to consider that spendthrift clauses are routinely included by attor-
neys without significant consultations with their clients.121 Concern-
117. UTC § 103(17), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(18) (Supp. 2003).
118. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3837(b) (Supp. 2003).
119. See discussion in Section VII.A, infra.
120. For that matter, shouldn't the same approach be taken in interpreting the provi-
sions of a revocable trust created prior to the UTC but which has not been
amended and becomes irrevocable after the UTC takes effect?
121. See Comment to UTC § 411(c) ("Spendthrift terms have sometimes been con-
strued to constitute a material purpose without inquiry into the intention of the
particular settlor .... This result is troublesome because spendthrift provisions
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ing spendthrift provisions in irrevocable trusts created before the
effective date of the legislation, however, we should assume that the
settlors and their attorneys understood the legal consequences then in
effect and acted with respect to those well established legal principles
on the effects of the spendthrift provisions.
The commentary does not explain the standard of "a clear indica-
tion" as used in UTC section 1106(a)(4). The term appears to connote
something between a standard of "clear and convincing evidence" and
a standard of "an indication."
The Uniform Trust Code uses the terms "clear" and "indication" in
various contexts. "Clear indication of a contrary intent" in UTC sec-
tion 1106(a)(4) appears to be a higher standard of proof than "the set-
tlor indicates an intention to create the trust,"12 2 "the terms of the
charitable trust do not indicate a particular charitable purpose or ben-
eficiary,"123 "an indication of the date of the writing or signing,"12 4
and "indicating acceptance of the trusteeship."125 The phrase seems
comparable to the UTC language that "[ilf the trustee maintains
records clearly indicating the respective interests, a trustee may in-
vest as a whole the property of two or more separate trusts."126 It is a
lower standard than "unless the terms of the trust expressly indicate
that a rule in this subsection does not apply" in connection with cer-
tain discretionary powers of a trustee 127 and requirements of "clear
and convincing evidence" for the creation, terms, amendment or revo-
are often added to instruments with little thought.... The question of whether
that was the intent of a particular settlor is instead a matter of fact to be deter-
mined on the totality of the circumstances.").
122. UTC § 402(a)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3828(a)(2) (Supp. 2003). UTC section
412(a) allows a court to modify the terms of a trust for unanticipated circum-
stances "in accordance with the settlor's probable intention." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30-3838(a) (Supp. 2003). UTC section 416 allows a court to modify the terms of
a trust to achieve the settlor's tax objectives "in a manner that is not contrary to
the settlor's probable intention." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3842 (Supp. 2003).
123. UTC § 405(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3831(b) (Supp. 2003). The selection of chari-
table purposes or beneficiaries under this subsection "must be consistent with the
settlor's intention to the extent it can be ascertained."
124. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3844 (written statement or list to dispose of items of tangi-
ble personal property), 30-3854(c)(2)(B) (instrument to amend or revoke a written
revocable trust) (Supp. 2003). These are Nebraska deviations from the official
Uniform Trust Code and use language contained in the Nebraska Uniform Pro-
bate Code applicable to "laundry lists" of tangible personal property and ho-
lographic wills. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2338 ("laundry lists"), 30-2328
(holographic wills) (Reissue 1995). See also In re Estate of Wells, 243 Neb. 152,
497 N.W.2d 683 (1993) (5-2 decision) (holographic will containing only month and
year substantially complied with statute).
125. UTC § 701(a)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3857(a)(2) (Supp. 2003).
126. UTC § 810(d); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3875(d) (Supp. 2003).
127. UTC § 814(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3879(b) (Supp. 2003).
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cation of an oral trust 1 28 and for reformation to correct mistakes to
establish "that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake or fact or law."129
The Uniform Probate Code as introduced in the Nebraska Unicam-
eral in 1973 contained a provision that "any rule of construction or
presumption provided in this code applies to instruments executed
and multiple-party accounts opened before the effective date unless
there is a clear indication of a contrary intent."130 After an interim
legislative study, public hearings, and study by the Nebraska State
Bar Association of the proposed Uniform Probate Code in its entirety,
the Judiciary Committee recommended that this language be omitted
"to avoid a potentially harsh rule of construction with respect to in-
struments in effect on the operative date of the act." 131 It reasoned:
In determining the intention of a testator of a will or other party to a written
instrument, the law in effect at the time the instrument was executed would
be an important element. It is likely that a court would, as a matter of inter-
pretation, apply the law in effect at the time of the original execution of an
instrument to determine the testator's intention but consider amendments
with respect to codicils or amendments. 1 3 2
The Bill as amended by the Committee in 1974 and reprinted did not
contain the subsection on rules of construction and presumptions ap-
plicable to instruments executed before the effective date of the Uni-
form Probate Code 1 33 and it was enacted in this form.13 4 The
128. UTC § 407 ("creation of an oral trust and its terms"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3833
(adding "or an amendment or revocation of an oral trust") (Supp. 2003).
129. UTC § 415; NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3841 (Supp. 2003). Nebraska changed the re-
quirement in UTC section 602(c)(2)(B) allowing a settlor to revoke or amend a
revocable trust by "any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence
of the settlor's intent" to require "an instrument evidencing an intent to amend
or revoke the trust." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3854(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 2003).
130. LB 354, 83rd Leg., 1st Sess., § 314(b)(5) at 223-24 (Neb. 1973).
131. Technical Memorandum on Amendments Proposed by the Judiciary Committee
to LB 354, at 17 (December 21, 1973). The recommendation may have been
prompted by the Report of the Special Probate Reform Committee of the Ne-
braska State Bar Association, comment on LB 354, § 314 (pages unnumbered)
(report delivered to the House of Delegates of the Nebraska State Bar Association
on October 31, 1973) which proposed a modification of the language applicable to
any rule of construction or presumption to instruments executed "before" the ef-
fective date by limiting the multiple-party accounts language to ones "opened af-
ter the effective date," and did not change the language "unless there is a clear
indication of a contrary intent." The Special Probate Reform Committee Report
added: "Comment: This amendment is because of Art. I, §16 [impairment of the
obligation of contracts], Constitution of the State of Nebraska."
132. Id. But cf. In re Estate of Florey, 212 Neb. 665, 325 N.W.2d 643 (1982) ("patent
ambiguity" rules precluded examination of surrounding circumstances).
133. LB 354, 83rd Leg., 1st Sess., at 233 (Neb. 1974); see 1974 NEB. LEGIS. J. 513, 660.
134. 1974 Neb. Laws at 262-63, LB 354 § 314, at 133-34.
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Nebraska Uniform Probate Code enacted in 1974 became operative
January 1, 1977, and applied to wills of decedents dying thereafter. 13 5
Application of the rules of construction and presumptions to preex-
isting trusts may not lessen "the need to know [those] two bodies of
law."13 6 It will continue to be necessary to consider the circumstances
in which the trust was created in order to interpret the "terms of a
trust"-"the manifestation of the settlor's intent regarding a trust's
provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may be estab-
lished by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial pro-
ceeding." Stated differently, it is necessary to consider the application
of the former rules of construction in order to determine whether or
not the new rules of the UTC are applicable. As a matter of sound
policy, the former rules of construction and presumptions should be
applied to carry out a preexisting trust unless there is a "clear indica-
tion" that the provisions of the Uniform Trust Code are not contrary to
the "manifestation of the settlor's intent" under the rules in effect
when the trust instrument was executed.
The provisions of UTC section 1106(a)(4) may tend to defeat,
rather than carry out, the probable intentions of settlors of irrevocable
trusts created before enactment of the UTC. It will certainly have
that effect upon spendthrift provisions. 137 It would have been prefer-
able for the Nebraska legislature to have omitted UTC section
1106(a)(4) just as the legislature omitted a similar provision from the
Nebraska Uniform Probate Code. Omission of UTC section 1106(a)(4)
would have left the question of a particular settlor's intent as "a mat-
ter of fact to be determined on the totality of the circumstances."138
B. Rules of Construction
1. Scope of "Rules of Construction"
Neither the text of UTC section 1106 nor its explanatory Comment
supplies further definition of the term "rule of construction." The brief
135. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2901(b)(1) (Reissue 1995). This section is Nebraska's
enactment of Uniform Probate Code section 8-101 to which the UTC Comment to
section 1106 refers as a "comparable uniform law effective date provision." Al-
though there are several "comparable" provisions, Section 30-2901 applies only to
"any wills of decedents dying thereafter" and contains no express language con-
cerning its applicability to inter vivos or testamentary trusts created before the
operative date. With respect to preexisting trusts, the Nebraska Uniform Pro-
bate Code would appear to have provided only administrative and procedural
rules which did not alter preexisting beneficial interests in the trusts.
136. See Comment to UTC § 1106: "In addition, any rules of construction or presump-
tion provided in the Code apply to preexisting trusts unless there is a clear indi-
cation of a contrary intent in the trust's terms. By applying the Code to
preexisting trusts, the need to know two bodies of law will quickly lessen."
137. See the discussion in the text starting supra note 117.
138. See the discussion in the text following supra note 129.
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UTC commentary on "rules of construction" appears following optional
UTC section 112 (Rules of Construction), which Nebraska omitted.139
The text of UTC section 112 states: "The rules of construction that
apply in this State to the interpretation of and disposition of property
by will also apply as appropriate to the interpretation of the terms of a
trust and the disposition of trust property."
The UTC takes a broad view that the rules applicable to trusts and
estates should be the same, but because of wide variations in the rules
of construction among the states, no uniform statutory rules of con-
struction should be a part of the UTC.140 Other than UTC section
112, however, the UTC does not identify which of its provisions are
intended to be rules of construction.
Nebraska adopted the Uniform Probate Code "rules of construc-
tion"14 1 as part of the 1974 enactment. However, it omitted a provi-
sion of the proposed Uniform Probate Code that the rules of
construction apply to previously executed instruments "unless there is
a clear indication of a contrary intent."14 2 Nebraska has not adopted
the recommended revisions to the Uniform Probate Code containing
rules of construction applicable to both wills and trusts, approved by
the NCCUSL in 1990, as amended in 1991 and 1993.143
The Nebraska legislative study group recommended that UTC sec-
tion 112 be omitted from the Nebraska enactment and that detailed
statutory rules of construction for trusts be developed by a separate
study. 144 Some of the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code rules of con-
struction seem to be much more substantive in nature than what is
commonly understood to be a rule of construction. For example, the
first section in Intestate Succession and Wills, Part 6, Rules of Con-
struction, of Nebraska's Uniform Probate Code contains a require-
ment that a devisee survive the testator by 120 hours unless the will
contains "language dealing explicitly" with survival.145 There is a
similar 120 hour condition of survival in the anti-lapse "rules of con-
struction" applicable to devises and class gifts. 14 6 Some of the items
characterized as rules of construction in the Comment to UTC section
112147 do not appear under the heading Rules of Construction in the
139. The Comment to UTC section 112 appears, in pertinent part, infra in the text
associated with note 152.
140. See Comment to UTC § 112 and General Comment to UTC Article I. The General
Comment to UTC Article I is reproduced in Report, supra note 3 at 7-8.
141. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2339 to 30-2350 (Reissue 1995).
142. See the discussion in the text following supra at note 129.
143. Uniform Probate Code Article II, Part 7, §§ 2-701 through 2-711, 8 U.L.A. pt. 1 at
181-205.
144. See Nebraska Comments on UTC § 112, Report, supra note 3 at 53-54.
145. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2339 (Reissue 1995).
146. Id. § 30-2343.
147. See text starting infra at note 151.
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Nebraska Uniform Probate Code. 148 Additionally, it is not clear
whether the rules of "patent ambiguity" and "latent ambiguity," some-
times used by courts in interpreting wills, would be applied in the
same manner to trust instruments. 14 9
The Nebraska Uniform Probate Code rules of construction state
that the intention of a testator is controlling and that the "rules of
construction expressed in the succeeding sections of this part apply
unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will."15o Enactment of
the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code in 1974 applied only to the wills
of decedents dying after January 1, 1977,151 so there was a reasonable
period of time for the transition to any new rules. The burden of fac-
tual proof under the Probate Code language "unless a contrary inten-
tion is indicated by the will" appears to be a lower standard than the
language in UTC section 1106(a)(4), "unless there is a clear indication
of a contrary intent in the terms of the trust."
The Comment to UTC section 112 explains that rules of construc-
tion are not simply rules of interpretation of trust instruments: 15 2
Rules of construction are not the same as constructional preferences. A
constructional preference is general in nature, providing general guidance for
resolving a wide variety of ambiguities. An example is a preference for a con-
struction that results in a complete disposition and avoid illegality. Rules of
construction, on the other hand, are specific in nature providing guidance for
resolving specific situations or construing specific terms. Unlike a construc-
tional preference, a rule of construction, when applicable, can lead to only one
result.
Rules of construction attribute intentions to individual donors based on
assumptions of common intention. Rules of construction are found both in
enacted statutes and in judicial decisions. Rules of construction can involve
the meaning to be given to a particular language in the document, such as the
meaning to be given to "heirs" or "issue." Rules of construction also address
situations the donor failed to anticipate. These include the failure to antici-
pate the predecease of a beneficiary or to specify the source from which ex-
penses are to be paid. Rules of construction can also concern assumptions as
to how a donor would have revised donative documents in light of certain
events occurring after execution. These include rules dealing with the effect
of a divorce and whether a specific devisee will receive a substitute gift if the
subject matter of the devise is disposed of during the testator's lifetime.
The decision to omit optional UTC section 112 creates a question
about what are considered rules of construction for the purposes of
148. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2209(23) (definition of "issue" for purposes of ap-
plication of the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code), 30-2333 (revocation of will by
divorce and nonrevocation by other circumstances) (Reissue 1995).
149. Cf. In re Estate of Florey, 212 Neb. 665, 325 N.W.2d 643 (1982) ("patent ambigu-
ity" doctrine precluded examination outside the four corners of a will, executed
before the Nebraska Uniform Probate Code, of a decedent who died after the
enactment).
150. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2341 (Reissue 1995).
151. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2901(b)(1) (Reissue 1995).
152. Comment, UTC § 112.
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UTC section 1106(a)(4). One probable example of a rule of construc-
tion is UTC section 814(b)(1), which provides: "unless the terms of the
trust expressly indicate that a rule in this subsection does not apply:
(1) a person other than a settlor who is a beneficiary and trustee of a
trust that confers on the trustee a power to make discretionary distri-
butions to or for the trustee's personal benefit may exercise the power
only in accordance with an ascertainable standard relating to the trus-
tee's individual health, education, support or maintenance within the
meaning of' the Internal Revenue Code.1 53 Another probable example
is the provision added to the Nebraska UTC section 1106 that: "Any
reference to the powers authorized under the Nebraska Trustees' Pow-
ers Act as such act existed prior to the operative date of this act is
deemed to be a reference to the powers authorized under the Ne-
braska Uniform Trust Code." 15 4 Some of the presumptions contained
in the UTC operate in a similar manner to rules of construction as
described in the UTC Comment to optional UTC section 112.155 UTC
section 602(a) provides that "[u]nless the terms of a trust expressly
provide that the trust is irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or amend
the trust," but that rule "does not apply to a trust created under an
instrument executed before [the effective date of this [Code]]."156 The
result is largely guesswork on which provisions of the UTC, other than
optional UTC section 112, are rules of construction within the mean-
ing of UTC section 1106(a)(4).
2. Constitutional Limitations
The Comment to UTC section 1106 observes without additional ex-
planation or reference to other sources: "Constitutional limitations
preclude retroactive application of rules of construction to alter prop-
erty rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the effective
date."157 This explanation was added following approval of the UTC
by NCCUSL at its 2000 summer meeting.158
Nebraska's omission of optional UTC section 112 narrows the like-
lihood that there will be constitutional issues from rules of construc-
153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3879(b)(1) (Supp. 2003). See Comment to UTC § 814(b)(1)
("Unless the terms of the trust expressly indicate that the rule in this subsection
is not to apply, the power to make discretionary distributions to a beneficiary-
trustee is automatically limited by the requisite ascertainable standard neces-
sary to avoid inclusion of the trust in the trustee's gross estate or result in a
taxable gift upon the trustee's release or exercise of the power.").
154. LB 130, 98th Leg., 1st Sess., § 110(c), at 69 (Neb. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
38,110(c) (Supp. 2003).
155. See discussion in section IV.C of this article, infra.
156. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3854(a) (Supp. 2003).
157. There are no references to other authorities on this issue in the Comments to
UTC sections 1106 or 112.
158. See discussion in section II.C of this article, supra.
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tion in the Nebraska UTC. Those issues will be much more significant
if, or when, there is an adoption of detailed rules of construction for
trusts as recommended in the legislative study report. 159 The concern
with the application of rules of construction to preexisting irrevocable
trusts under Nebraska UTC section 1106(a)(4) is not primarily consti-
tutional but, rather, with distortions in the application of rules relat-
ing to ascertaining the intention of the settlor..
There will be situations, such as the authority under UTC section
111(d)(1) for nonjudicial settlement agreements of "the interpretation
or construction of the terms of the trust," which will need to take con-
stitutional issues relating to beneficial interests into account. Insofar
as the nonjudicial settlement agreement relates to a bona fide compro-
mise of an existing controversy, UTC section 111(d)(1) seems properly
applicable to preexisting trusts. 160 To the extent that a nonjudicial
settlement agreement might affect beneficial interests in preexisting
trusts apart from an existing controversy concerning "the interpreta-
tion or construction of the terms of the trust," UTC section 111(d)(1)
may be constitutionally suspect. The apparent "rule of construction"
in UTC section 814(b)(1)161 that authorizations of discretionary distri-
butions to a beneficiary-trustee are automatically limited by an ascer-
tainable standard also seems constitutionally suspect in its
retroactive application. This type of analysis illustrates that provi-
sions of the UTC having an effect on beneficial interests in preexisting
trusts cannot avoid constitutional scrutiny by being identified as
"rules of construction" under UTC section 1106(a)(4).
C. Presumptions
1. Scope of Presumptions
The Uniform Trust Code contains a variety of express and implicit
presumptions. Presumptions provide a tentative rule of construction
and assign the burden of factual proof in the circumstances. The Ne-
braska Evidence Rules provide that: "In all cases not otherwise pro-
vided for by statute or by these rules a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the non-
existence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence."162
UTC section 413(a) "modifies the doctrine of cy pres by presuming
that the settlor had a general charitable intent when a particular
charitable purpose becomes impossible or impracticable to
159. See Report, supra note 3 at 54.
160. See discussion in section VII.B of this article, infra.
161. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3879(b)(1) (Supp. 2003).
162. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-301 (Reissue 1995).
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achieve."163 UTC section 802(c) states that a transaction between the
trustee and the trustee's spouse, other family members, an attorney or
agent of the trustee, or a corporation or other person or enterprise in
which the trustee or another person has a significant interest which
might affect the trustee's best judgment, "is presumed to be affected
by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests."164 The pre-
sumption does not apply to an investment by a trustee in securities of
an investment company or investment trust in which the trustee or an
affiliate participates. 165 UTC section 808(d) states that a person,
other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to direct the modification
or termination of the trust "is presumptively a fiduciary who, as such,
is required to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust
and the interests of the beneficiaries."166 UTC section 602 reverses
the current general rule "that a trust is presumed irrevocable absent
evidence of a contrary intent,"16 7 but the new rule does not apply to a
"trust created under an instrument executed before [the effective date
of this [Codel]."168 With respect to modification or termination of a
noncharitable irrevocable trust by consent, UTC section 411(c) pro-
vides that a spendthrift provision "is not presumed to constitute a ma-
terial purpose of the trust,"169 which changes what apparently would
have been the rule prior to the UTC in view of Nebraska's traditional
enforcement of spendthrift provisions.170 The commentary character-
izes as a "presumption of abuse" the rule that an exculpatory term
drafted by a trustee is invalid unless the trustee proves that the term
is fair under the circumstances, although the text of the section does
163. Comment, UTC § 413 ("Traditional doctrine did not supply that presumption,
leaving it to the courts to determine whether the settlor had a general charitable
intent."). See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3839 (Supp. 2003); Report, supra note 3 at
131 (citing In re Last Will and Testament of Teeters, 205 Neb. 735, 288 N.W.2d
735 (1980) ("a general charitable intent is a precondition to the exercise of the
court's cy pres power")).
164. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3867(c) (Supp. 2003). The Comment to UTC section 802
characterizes these transactions as "presumptively voidable, not void." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-3867 (Supp. 2003) omits UTC section 802(d), which provides that a
transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary not involving trust property and
in which the trustee obtains an advantage "is voidable by the beneficiary unless
the trustee establishes that the transaction was fair to the beneficiary."
165. UTC § 802(f); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3867(e) (Supp. 2003). The Comment to UTC
section 802 characterizes the general rule in UTC section 802(b) relating to trans-
actions "for the trustee's own personal account" as "irrebuttably presumed to be
affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests."
166. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3873(d) (Supp. 2003).
167. Comment, UTC § 602.
168. UTC § 602(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3854(a) (Supp. 2003).
169. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3837(c) (Supp. 2003).
170. See Nebraska Comment (3) on UTC § 411(c), Report, supra note 3, at 124.
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not use the word "presumption."171 In a similar sense, the UTC, itself,
operates as a presumption inasmuch as it provides default rules which
apply "except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust."172
2. Constitutional Limitations
The Comment to UTC section 1106 does not express the same con-
cern for constitutional limitations on the retroactive application of
presumptions in the UTC as for rules of construction. It states
merely: "Constitutional limitations preclude retroactive application of
rules of construction to alter property rights under trusts that became
irrevocable prior to the effective date." 173 Nevertheless, the same con-
stitutional limitations would apply if the presumption operates in a
manner similar to that of a rule of construction in its effect on a bene-
ficial interest in an irrevocable trust created before the operative date
of the statute.
Two of the presumptions of the UTC should not be applied to pre-
existing trusts, at least on the basis of effectuating the settlor's inten-
tions. The presumption that spendthrift provisions are not a material
purpose of the trust, a significant change in Nebraska law, should not
be applied to the modification or termination of a preexisting nonchar-
itable irrevocable trust by consent under UTC section 411(c). The pre-
sumption of a general charitable intent should not be applied to trusts
established before the operative date of the UTC for the same reasons,
or alternatively by the exercise of judicial discretion under UTC sec-
tion 413(a)(3) or the court's constitutional equity powers. The other
presumptions of the UTC do not appear to affect retroactively the ben-
eficial interests under preexisting trusts.
V. ACT DONE BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE
UTC section 1106(a)(5) provides that "an act done before [the effec-
tive date of the [Code]] is not affected by this [Code]."'174 The evolu-
tion of UTC section 1106 and its Comment suggests that this language
may apply to the establishment of beneficial interests in irrevocable
trusts created before the operative date of the UTC.175 If so, UTC sec-
171. Comment, UTC § 1008; NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3897 (Supp. 2003). The effect of an
exculpatory term under UTC section 1008 cannot be overridden by the terms of
the trust. UTC § 105(b)(10); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(10) (Supp. 2003).
172. UTC § 105(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(a) (Supp. 2003).
173. Comment, UTC § 1106.
174. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(5) (Supp. 2003). The Comment to UTC section
1106 states only: "Nor is an act done before the effective date of the Code affected
by the Code's enactment." UTC section 103(1) provides: "Action,' with respect to
an act of a trustee, includes a failure to act." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(1) (Supp.
2003).
175. See discussion of the evolution of UTC section 1106 and its Comment in Section
II.C of this article, supra.
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tion 1106(a)(5) will become very important in defining the retroactiv-
ity of the UTC to preexisting irrevocable trusts so as to avoid
constitutional issues. In any event, UTC section 1106(a)(5) insures
the finality of administrative and procedural acts "done" before the
new provisions come into play.
When first included in the drafts of the UTC, the provision fol-
lowed that of the Uniform Probate Code:176 "an act done before the
effective date in any proceeding and any accrued right is not impaired
by this code." The draft Comment noted:' 77
But recognizing constitutional concerns, excluded from coverage are trusts
created prior to the Act's effective date if such application would impair a
vested right. For such an impairment to occur, however, the trust would have
to be irrevocable as of the effective date and the particular provision of the Act
would have to actually reduce or otherwise threaten a beneficial interest.
In the course of further drafts during the later stages of the Com-
mittee activity, the language "in any proceeding and any accrued
right" was deleted. The language "an act done before the effective
date" was retained. The phrase "is not impaired by this code" was
changed to "is not affected by this code." The Comment was reworded
in the months before the UTC's adoption by NCCUSL and again fol-
lowing its adoption. But other than the sentence on the retroactive
application of rules of construction, the final Comment does not define
the potential constitutional limitations on retroactivity of the UTC.
Both the text and the background of UTC section 1106(a)(5) sug-
gest its application to all acts done before the effective date of the
UTC, whether the act is administrative, procedural, or one establish-
ing beneficial interests in an irrevocable trust. That interpretation of
UTC section 1106(a)(5) can facilitate implementation of the UTC and
avoid potential constitutional issues concerning retroactivity of the
enactment.
VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The UTC has a simple transitional rule concerning statutes of limi-
tations which, in practical effect, means that events occurring before
the operative date of the UTC are measured by timelines then applica-
ble and events after the operative date are measured by the new time-
lines. UTC section 1106(b) states: "If a right is acquired,
extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a prescribed period that
has commenced to run under any other statute before [the effective
date of the [Code]], that statute continues to apply to the right even if
176. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2901(b)(4) (Reissue 1995) (UPC § 8-101(b)(4)). The UTC
draft stated: "an act done before the effective date in any proceeding and any
accrued right is not impaired by this [Act]." Draft of October 13, 1997, § 7-
107(b)(5).
177. See discussion in section II.C of this article, supra.
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it has been repealed or superseded." 178 This language avoids constitu-
tional issues involved in retroactive changes of time limits.17 9 The
time periods for commencing judicial proceedings cannot be altered by
the terms of a trust. 180
The Nebraska Uniform Probate Code was enacted with identical
language:lsl "If a right is acquired, extinguished or barred upon the
expiration of a prescribed period of time which has commenced to run
by the provisions of any statute before the operative date, the provi-
sions shall remain in force with respect to that right." The Nebraska
Supreme Court applied this language in Jacobson v. Nemesio.l8 2 J.
Herbert Jacobson's wife died before the operative date of the Nebraska
Uniform Probate Code but her will was not filed for probate until after
the operative date. Herbert sought to waive his rights under the will
and take a statutory share of his wife's estate under the former stat-
ute allowing an election within one year "after the issuance of letters
testamentary." The applicable time limit for an election under the
Uniform Probate Code was "within six months after the first publica-
tion of notice to creditors." Focusing on the language in the transi-
tional rule "right. . . has commenced to run by the provisions of any
statute before the operative date," the court held that since no letters
testamentary had been issued when the Uniform Probate Code be-
came operative, the six month statute of limitations of the Uniform
Probate Code was controlling and Herbert's election was too late.' 8 3
UTC section 1005 provides new time periods for commencing a pro-
ceeding against a trustee for breach of trust.18 4 The section also
changes rules pertaining to the form of disclosure and the standards
for measuring time (when the report is sent rather than received).' 8 5
UTC section 604 establishes new time limits for commencing a judicial
proceeding to contest the validity of a revocable trust and distribu-
tions of trust property from a revocable trust which becomes irrevoca-
178. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(b) (Supp. 2003). The Comment to UTC section 1106
states: "Also, rights already barred by a statute of limitation or rule under former
law are not revived by a possibly longer statute or more liberal rule under this
Code."
179. See Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Ass'n, 255 Neb. 977, 987, 588 N.W.2d 565, 573
(1999) ("The Legislature's power to change limitation periods is subject to two
restrictions. First, the Legislature may not deprive a defendant of a bar which
has already become complete. Second, the Legislature may not deprive a plaintiff
of an already accrued cause of action without providing the plaintiff a reasonable
time in which to file the action.").
180. UTC § 105(b)(12), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(12) (Supp. 2003).
181. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2901(b)(4) (Reissue 1995).
182. 204 Neb. 180, 281 N.W.2d 552 (1979).
183. Id. at 185, 281 N.W.2d at 555.
184. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3894 (Supp. 2003).
185. See Report, supra note 3, at 314-15.
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ble by reason of the settlor's death.18 6 These new time periods will
apply prospectively to actions initiating a limitation period on and af-
ter the operative date of the Nebraska UTC.
VII. SUBSTANTIVE TRUST RULES WARRANTING
SPECIAL CONSIDERATION
A. Claims of Certain Judgment Creditors Against
Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts
The UTC contains substantive provisions allowing some creditors'
claims against spendthrift and discretionary trusts. UTC section
503(b) states:' 8 7 "Even if a trust contains a spendthrift provision, a
beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse who has a judgment or
court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance, or a
judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection of a
beneficiary's interest in the trust, may obtain from a court an order
attaching present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary." UTC section 504(c)(1) states:18 8 "To the extent a trustee
has not complied with a standard of distribution or has abused a dis-
cretion: (1) a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judg-
ment or court order against the beneficiary for support or
maintenance of the beneficiary's child, spouse, or former spouse." The
effect of a spendthrift provision and the rights of creditors in these
situations cannot be overridden by the terms of a trust. 8 9
Under prior Nebraska judicial decisions, the assets of spendthrift
trusts could be reached by a judgment creditor of a trust beneficiary
only to the extent the trust beneficiary could enforce payment of that
amount from the trust. 190 UTC section 503(b) broadens the rules for
186. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3856 (Supp. 2003). The Nebraska statute changes the UTC
times applicable to contesting the validity of the revocable trust from the earlier
of three years after death or 120 days after sending notice to the earlier of one
year after death or 120 days after sending notice.
187. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3848(b) (Supp. 2003).
188. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c)(1) (Supp. 2003). UTC section 502(c)(2) states that:
"the court shall direct the trustee to pay to the child, spouse, or former spouse
such amount as is equitable under the circumstances but not more than the
amount the trustee would have been required to distribute to or for the benefit of
the beneficiary had the trustee complied with the standard or not abused the
discretion." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3849(c)(2) (Supp. 2003).
189. UTC § 105(b)(5); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(5) (Supp. 2003).
190. See O'Shea v. O'Shea, 191 Neb. 217, 222, 214 N.W.2d 486, 489 (1974). UTC sec-
tion 506 allows a creditor or assignee of a spendthrift trust to reach a mandatory
distribution of income or principal if the trustee has not made distribution within
a reasonable time. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3851 (Supp. 2003). So does current Ne-
braska law. See Report, note 3, supra, at 164-65.
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specified judgment creditors to include discretionary distributions by
the trustee. 19 1
The property of discretionary trusts has not previously been sub-
ject to the claims of judgment creditors.19 2 UTC section 504(c)(1)
changes the prior Nebraska judicial rules193 to allow "the court to sat-
isfy a judgment or court order against the beneficiary [of a discretion-
ary trust] for support or maintenance of the beneficiary's child, spouse
or former spouse" to the extent a trustee has abused its discretion.
These changes amount to more than merely new rules of construc-
tion. They alter the previously existing interests of the trust benefi-
ciaries when applied to trusts created before the operative date of the
UTC. It should make no difference analytically concerning the retro-
active effects of the legislation that the previously existing interests
were secured in accordance with judicial decisions rather than by vir-
tue of statutory provisions. 194
With respect to potential constitutional issues concerning the ret-
roactive effects of UTC sections 503(b) and 504(c),195 there is an ap-
191. See Report, supra note 3 at 154. Similarly, UTC section 505(a)(2) allows a credi-
tor or assignee of the settlor to reach the maximum amount of an irrevocable
trust that can be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
3850(a)(2) (Supp. 2003).
192. See Doksansky v. Norwest Bank, 260 Neb. 100, 615 N.W.2d 104 (2000); Smith v.
Smith, 246 Neb. 193, 517 N.W.2d 394 (1994).
193. See Report, supra note 3 at 158.
194. The "state action" concept inherent in the Due Process Clauses in federal and
state constitutions is applicable to both the legislative and judicial branches of
state government. See discussion in State v. Redmond, 262 Neb. 411, 418, 631
N.W.2d 501, 507 (2001) (one of the saga of Nebraska decisions involving "malice"
as an element of the crime of second degree murder) ("If a state legislature is
barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a
State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving pre-
cisely the same result by judicial construction.") (quoting Bouie v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-354 (1964)). As the basis for its decision in State v.
Redmond, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated: "a judicial decision interpreting a
statute may be applied retroactively unless the decision denies due process by
being both unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been
expressed prior to the conduct in issue." 262 Neb. at 420, 631 N.W.2d at 508
(emphasis in original text); see also Karrer v. Karrer, 190 Neb. 610, 613-614, 211
N.W.2d 116, 118-19 (1973) ("The power of the courts to vacate or modify their
own judgments is limited. [citations omitted] The underlying basis of our hold-
ings ... is that rights have vested and are not therefore subject of modification.
The Legislature is subject to similar limitations and the foundation is constitu-
tional and lies in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Statutes may not operate retroactively so as to
impair vested rights.... Private rights of parties which have vested by the judg-
ment of a court cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation, but must be
enforced by the courts regardless of such legislation.").
195. For a discussion of decisions in other states concerning retroactive legislative
diminution of spendthrift provisions, see IIA WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON
TRUSTS § 152.1, at 105-08 (4th ed. 1987). UTC section 503(c), Neb. Rev. Stat.
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pealing analogy to Nebraska decisions on the retroactive effects of
changes in land zoning requirements. The zoning decisions constitute
a significant body of Nebraska law on the constitutional limitations of
retroactive legislation. The crux of these decisions is that although
landowners have no property right to a continuation of the statutory
provisions, amendments cannot be applied retroactively to diminish
the uses which were lawfully established before the legislative
changes. 196 The spendthrift and discretionary trust changes do not
affect fully "vested" rights in a property law sense, since under present
Nebraska law, judgment creditors have at least nominally the same
rights as a trust beneficiary to enforce payment from the trust. The
significant expansion by UTC sections 503(b) and 504(c) of the rights
of certain judgment creditors, however, diminishes the property and
value of the trust. At best, the changes may be of benefit to the trust
beneficiary whose adverse judgment is satisfied and to the specified
judgment creditors, but at the expense of the remaining trust benefi-
ciaries and of the trust edifice previously created by the settlor.
It is entirely appropriate for the State to exercise its legislative
powers to reflect the public policies contained in UTC sections 503(b)
and 504(c).19 7 However, the application to trusts created before the
enactment seems constitutionally suspect.
One response to spendthrift provisions in trusts created before en-
actment of the UTC is to consider them as "an act done before [the
effective date of the UTC]]" and not affected by the new rules by virtue
of UTC section 1106(a)(5).198 A better approach would be to limit
their applicability statutorily to trusts which become irrevocable after
the operative date of the UTC.
B. Nonjudicial Settlements
The drafters of the UTC favor nonjudicial resolution of disputes
relating to trusts.199 UTC section 111(b) provides that "[e]xcept as
§ 30-3848(c) (Supp. 2003), does not have retroactive effect, but recognizes only
that "[a] spendthrift provision is unenforceable against a claim of this state or the
United States to the extent a statute of this state or federal law so provides." (em-
phasis added).
196. See cases cited supra note 45.
197. It would also seem constitutionally permissible for courts to do the same thing
prospectively within their constitutional equity jurisdiction in the absence of leg-
islation. If, or to the extent that, the UTC spendthrift provisions retroactively
overrule prior Nebraska Supreme Court decisions, the provisions would appear to
violate the constitutional equity jurisdiction of the courts. See discussion in Part
VIII of this article, infra.
198. See discussion in Part V of this article, infra.
199. "While the Uniform Trust Code recognizes that a court may intervene in the ad-
ministration of a trust to the extent its jurisdiction is invoked by interested per-
sons or otherwise provided by law (see Section 201(a)), resolution of disputes by
nonjudicial means is encouraged." Comment to UTC § 111.
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otherwise provided in [UTC section 111(c)], interested persons 20 0 may
enter into a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement with respect to
any matter involving a trust."201 Although UTC section 111(b) ap-
pears to give broad nonjudicial settlement authority, UTC section
111(c) imposes a significant limitation on such authority: "(c) A nonju-
dicial settlement agreement is valid only to the extent it does not vio-
late a material purpose of the trust and includes terms and conditions
that could be properly approved by the court under this [Code] or other
applicable law."20 2 The Comment adds: "Under this section, a nonju-
dicial settlement cannot be used to produce a result not authorized by
law, such as to terminate a trust in an impermissible manner."20 3 To
protect against possible abuse, UTC section 111(e) allows any "inter-
ested person" to "request the court to approve a nonjudicial settlement
agreement, to determine whether the representation as provided in
[Article] 3 was adequate, and to determine whether the agreement
contains terms and conditions the court could have properly
approved."20 4
The limitation in UTC section 111(c) that a nonjudicial settlement
agreement must not violate a "material purpose" of the trust is consis-
tent with existing law in most United States jurisdictions limiting the
rights of beneficiaries to terminate a trust.205 Although there is no
published decision by a Nebraska appellate court expressly adopting
200. UTC section 111(a) defines the term "interested persons" as "persons whose con-
sent would be required in order to achieve a binding settlement were the settle-
ment to be approved by the court." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3811 (Supp. 2003).
201. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3811(b) (Supp. 2003). UTC section 111(d) provides a nonex-
clusive list of matters that may be resolved by a nonjudicial settlement
agreement:
(1) the interpretation or construction of the terms of the trust;
(2) the approval of a trustee's report or accounting;
(3) direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a particular act or
the grant to a trustee of any necessary or desirable power;
(4) the resignation or appointment of a trustee and the determination of
a trustee's compensation;
(5) transfer of a trust's principal place of administration; and
(6) liability of a trustee for an action relating to a trust.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3811(d) (Supp. 2003). UTC section 111(e) provides that
"[any interested person may request the court to approve a nonjudicial settle-
ment agreement, to determine whether the representation as provided in [Arti-
cle] 3 was adequate, and to determine whether the agreement contains terms and
conditions the court could have properly approved." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3811(e)
(Supp. 2003).
202. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3811(c) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
203. Comment, UTC § 111.
204. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3811(e) (Supp. 2003).
205. The leading case usually cited as establishing this rule is Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337(2) (1959)
adopts this rule: "(2) If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a
material purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination." A
few United States jurisdictions do not follow this rule. See, e.g., Fisher v. Ladd,
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the "material purpose" rule, it appears reasonable to assume that Ne-
braska would follow Section 337 of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, which adopts the "material purpose" rule.206
Although the use in UTC section 111(c) of the "material purpose"
rule appears consistent with existing Nebraska law, UTC section 111
does change Nebraska law in two ways. First, UTC section 111 ex-
pressly allows binding nonjudicial settlements. In Rohlff v. German
Old People's Home,2 07 a case involving a testamentary charitable
trust,20 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed, among other issues,
the question of whether a settlement agreement between the charita-
ble beneficiary and the heirs of the decedent changed the rights of the
parties. The court concluded that the settlement agreement could not
do so:
The trust itself is not and cannot be affected by any compromise as neither the
court nor the litigants have power and authority to change its nature and pur-
pose. Neither can the use be diverted by the beneficiaries for the time being
through an agreement or arbitration. They cannot alien it, for the property is
not theirs to sell. They cannot donate it, for the title is not in them. They
cannot misapply it, for the use for which it was created cannot be changed.
2 0 9
The court recognized that, under certain circumstances, parties could
enter into a binding compromise. 2 1o Nevertheless, the general rule
prohibiting nonjudicial compromises is clear. Thus, UTC section 111
268 S.E.2d 20 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). A few states have modified the rule by stat-
ute. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.590.2 (1992).
206. UTC section 411(b) expressly adopts the 'material purpose" rule for judicial pro-
ceedings: "(b) A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent
of all of the beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not
necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
3837(b) (Supp. 2003). However, note that UTC section 411(c) provides that "[a]
spendthrift provision in the terms of the trust is not presumed to constitute a
material purpose of the trust." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3837(c) (Supp. 2003). UTC
section 111 contains no special rule for spendthrift provisions. For a further dis-
cussion of this difference between UTC sections 111 and 411, see infra section
VII.C.
207. 143 Neb. 636, 10 N.W.2d 686 (1943)
208. The testamentary gift was to a charitable corporation. The Nebraska Supreme
Court treated the gift as equivalent to a charitable trust:
The general rule is that a bequest in the form of a trust to a charitable
corporation organized for the same charitable purpose as that shown in
the purported trust is not technically a trust. It is a gift to the charitable
corporation to accomplish the purposes of the corporation, but is
equivalent to a bequest upon a charitable trust.
Id. at 641, 10 N.W.2d at 690.
209. 143 Neb. at 649, 10 N.W.2d at 690.
210. "[Tlhe right to compromise a controversy in a proper case is undeniable. Where,
therefore, a charitable gift is contingent on certain events, the trust is not per-
verted by a compromise agreement through which the trustees receive a certain
definite amount of property impressed with the same trust in lieu of the contin-
gent interest." Id.
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changes the general rule in Rohlff relating to binding nonjudicial
settlements.
Second, UTC section 111 authorizes use of virtual representation
in nonjudicial settlements. Although Nebraska has recognized the
concept of virtual representation before adoption of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code,211 the UPC provides statutory authority for virtual repre-
sentation only in formal judicial proceedings involving the
administration of the estates of decedents, minors, protected persons,
or incapacitated persons and in judicially supervised settlements.212
In contrast, UTC sections 111 and 304 authorize use of virtual repre-
sentation in the context of nonjudicial settlement agreements.
One final point deserves attention. The nonjudicial settlement au-
thority created by UTC section 111 is significantly narrower than the
authority for private agreements created by the Nebraska Probate
Code. Section 30-24,110 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes provides
that competent "successors"213 to a decedent
may agree among themselves to alter the interests, shares, or amounts to
which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under the laws of
intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written contract executed by all
who are affected by its provisions. The personal representative shall abide by
the terms of the agreement subject to his obligation to administer the estate
for the benefit of creditors, to pay all taxes and costs of administration, and to
carry out the responsibilities of his office for the benefit of any successors of
the decedent who are not parties. 2 1 4
In contrast to the wide ranging private agreement power created by
the Nebraska Probate Code, UTC section 111 allows nonjudicial set-
tlements only to the extent they do not violate a "material purpose" of
the trust. Further, such settlements must include only terms and con-
ditions that a court could approve under the UTC or other applicable
law.215
Although UTC section 111 recognizes nonjudicial settlement agree-
ments and use of virtual representation in connection with such
211. See JUDICIARY COMM. OF 83RD NEBR. LEG., WORKING PAPERS AND PRELIMINARY
INTERIM STUDY REPORT ON A REVISED NEBRASKA PROBATE CODE 36-37 (1973).
212. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2222 (Reissue 1995).
213. The Nebraska Probate Code defines the term "successors" as "those persons,
other than creditors, who are entitled to property of a decedent under his or her
will or the Nebraska Probate Code." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2209(46) (Reissue
1995).
214. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-24,110 (Reissue 1995). Section 30-24,110 further provides:
Personal representatives of decedents' estates are not required to see to
the performance of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person who is
willing to accept the trust. Accordingly, trustees of a testamentary trust
are successors for the purposes of this section. Nothing herein relieves
trustees of any duties owed to beneficiaries of trusts.
215. "Under this section, a nonjudicial settlement cannot be used to produce a result
not authorized by law, such as to terminate a trust in an impermissible manner."
Comment, UTC § 111.
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agreements, UTC section 111 does not represent an enormous change
in Nebraska law. The ability to use nonjudicial settlements is care-
fully restricted, in particular by the requirement that any such settle-
ment not violate a "material purpose" of the trust. UTC section 111 is
narrower than the private agreements provision in the Nebraska Pro-
bate Code. In short, although UTC section 111 should facilitate nonju-
dicial resolution of disputes relating to trusts, it will not significantly
enhance the abilities of beneficiaries to depart from the intentions of
the settlor.2 16
C. Modification or Termination of a Noncharitable
Irrevocable Trust by Consent
UTC Section 411 provides for judicial modification or termination
of a noncharitable irrevocable trust by consent. If the settlor joins
with a112 17 beneficiaries, UTC Section 411(a) permits modification or
termination of the trust, "even if the modification or termination is
inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust."218 In general, UTC
section 411(a) appears to codify existing Nebraska law.219
216. Arizona's version of UTC section 111 applies prospectively only, suggesting that
the Arizona legislature had concerns about enhancing the abilities of benefi-
ciaries of existing trusts to depart from the intentions of the settlor.
217. The Comment to UTC Section 411 explains:
The provisions of Article 3 on representation, virtual representation and
the appointment and approval of representatives appointed by the court
apply to the determination of whether all beneficiaries have signified
consent under this section. The authority to consent on behalf of another
person, however, does not include authority to consent over the other
person's objection. See Section 301(b). Regarding the persons who may
consent on behalf of a beneficiary, see Sections 302 through 305. A con-
sent given by a representative is invalid to the extent there is a conflict
of interest between the representative and the person represented.
Given this limitation, virtual representation of a beneficiary's interest by
another beneficiary pursuant to Section 304 will rarely be available in a
trust termination case, although it should be routinely available in cases
involving trust modification, such as a grant to the trustee of additional
powers. If virtual or other form of representation is unavailable, Section
305 of the Code permits the court to appoint a representative who may
give the necessary consent to the proposed modification or termination
on behalf of the minor, incapacitated, unborn, or unascertained benefici-
ary. The ability to use virtual and other forms of representation to con-
sent on a beneficiary's behalf to a trust termination or modification has
not traditionally been part of the law, although there are some notable
exceptions. Compare Restatement (Second) Section 337(1) (1959) (benefi-
ciary must not be under incapacity), with Hatch v. Riggs National Bank,
361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (guardian ad litem authorized to consent
on beneficiary's behalf).
218. UTC § 411(a), NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3837(a) (Supp. 2003).
219. "Nebraska law appears to be consistent with Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 338(1) (1959) which permits termination upon joint action of the settlor and
beneficiaries." Report, supra note 3, at 122. However, the Report notes that UTC
section 411(a) is
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As a codification of the "common law of trusts," UTC section 411(a)
should not present adverse federal tax consequences for a settlor.
Helvering v. Helmholz 220 held that a power of "all of the then benefi-
ciaries, other than testamentary appointees" (which included the set-
tlor as a trust beneficiary) to terminate the trust was not a taxable
power to revoke, alter or amend the trust under provisions of the ex-
isting federal estate tax law. 22 1 Relying on the Restatement of the
Law of Trusts, 22 2 the Court stated:22 3
The general rule is that all parties in interest may terminate the trust. The
clause in question added nothing to the rights which the law conferred. Con-
gress cannot tax as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at the death of the settlor a trust created in a state whose law permits
all the beneficiaries to terminate the trust.
In contrast to UTC § 411(a), UTC sections 411(b) and 411(c) signifi-
cantly change Nebraska law. UTC section 411(b) provides: 2 24
(b) A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent of all of
the beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not nec-
essary to achieve any material purpose of the trust. A noncharitable irrevoca-
ble trust may be modified upon consent of all of the beneficiaries if the court
concludes that modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the
trust.
UTC section 411(c) 2 2 5 provides that "[a] spendthrift provision in the
terms of the trust is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of
the trust." Although UTC section 411(b) codifies the so-called Claflin
rule226 that trust beneficiaries cannot modify or terminate an irrevo-
cable trust if continuance of the trust is necessary to achieve a mate-
rial purpose 22 7 of the trust, UTC section 411(c) changes Nebraska law
[n]ot consistent with Nebraska law as it relates to guardian's authority
to amend or terminate a trust. Also UTC § 411(a) is inconsistent with
NPC § 30-2637(3) to the extent that the Nebraska Probate Code requires
a showing of clear and convincing evidence before the court can exercise
or release a power of the ward as trustee or create a revocable or irrevo-
cable trust which may last beyond the ward's disability or life time.
Report, supra note 3, at 124.
220. 296 U.S. 93 (1935).
221. The decision involved what is current Internal Revenue Code section 2038. See
Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a)(2). As a characterization of state property law for fed-
eral tax purposes, the decision should be equally applicable to Internal Revenue
Code section 2036(a)(2). Otherwise, all irrevocable trusts might be subject to in-
clusion as a retained income "right" unless the trust expressly negatived applica-
tion of the "general rule" applied in Helvering v. Helmholz.
222. 296 U.S. at 97 n.3 (citing sections 337 and 338).
223. 296 U.S. at 97.
224. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3837(b) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
225. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3837(c) (Supp. 2003).
226. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
227. The drafters of the UTC rely on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts to define the
term "material purpose":
The requirement that the trust no longer serve a material purpose
before it can be terminated by the beneficiaries does not mean that the
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by ending the existing presumption that a spendthrift provision re-
flects a material purpose of a trust.228 The drafters of the UTC argue
that 2 2
9
[s]pendthrift terms have sometimes been construed to constitute a material
purpose without inquiry into the intention of the particular settlor. For exam-
ples, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 337 (1959); George G. Bogert
& George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees Section 1008 (Rev. 2d ed.
1983); and 4 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts Sec-
tion 337 (4th ed. 1989). This result is troublesome because spendthrift provi-
sions are often added to instruments with little thought.
Although UTC section 411(c) changes the existing Nebraska presump-
tion relating to spendthrift provisions, UTC section 411(c) "does not
negate the possibility that continuation of a trust to assure spend-
thrift protection might have been a material purpose of the particular
settlor. The question of whether that was the intent of a particular
settlor is instead a matter of fact to be determined on the totality of
the circumstances." 230
There is a peculiar discontinuity between UTC section 111(c) and
UTC sections 411(b) and (c). UTC section 111(c) provides that "[a]
nonjudicial settlement agreement is valid only to the extent it does not
violate a material purpose of the trust... ."231 UTC section 411(b) also
refers to a "material purpose" of a trust, but UTC section 411(c) pro-
vides that a court is not to presume that a spendthrift provision re-
flects a "material purpose" of the settlor. UTC section 111 does not
include this special rule for spendthrift provisions. Does the failure to
include the special spendthrift rule in UTC section 111 mean that the
current Nebraska presumption that a spendthrift provision reflects a
material purpose of the trust will continue for purposes of UTC section
111? Although UTC section 111 deals with nonjudicial settlement
trust has no remaining function. In order to be material, the purpose
remaining to be performed must be of some significance:
Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a pur-
pose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or objective
on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to the beneficiary's
management skills, judgment, or level of maturity. Thus, a court may
look for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating that the trust
arrangement represented to the settlor more than a method of allocating
the benefits of property among multiple beneficiaries, or a means of of-
fering to the beneficiaries (but not imposing on them) a particular ad-
vantage. Sometimes, of course, the very nature or design of a trust
suggests its protective nature or some other material purpose.
Comment, UTC § 411 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 65 cmt. d
(Tentative Draft No. 3, approved 2001).
228. "Section 411(c) represents a departure from current Nebraska law by removing
the presumption that a spendthrift provision qualifies as a material provision of a
trust." Report, supra note 3, at 124.
229. Comment, UTC § 411.
230. Id.
231. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3811(b) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
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agreements and UTC section 411 deals with judicial modifications or
terminations, that difference does not explain why only UTC section
411 makes a specific reference to spendthrift provisions. If the argu-
ment in support of UTC section 411(c) (presuming a spendthrift provi-
sion reflects a material purpose of the settlor "is troublesome because
spendthrift provisions are often added to instruments with little
thought") is persuasive in the context of UTC section 411, the argu-
ment is equally persuasive in the context of UTC section 111. Alterna-
tively, if the argument in support of UTC section 411(c) is not
persuasive, neither UTC section 411 nor UTC section 111 should have
a special rule for spendthrift provisions. 23 2 It would be helpful to re-
examine the question of whether UTC sections 111 and 411 should
treat spendthrift provisions consistently, and if so, whether the proper
treatment is that reflected in UTC section 411(c).
D. Modification or Termination Because of Unanticipated
Circumstances
UTC section 412(a) represents a significant change in Nebraska
law because it provides statutory authority for use of the doctrine of
equitable deviation to modify the dispositive terms of a private ex-
press trust:2 33
(a) The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust
or terminate the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the set-
tlor, modification or termination will further the purposes of the trust. To the
extent practicable, the modification must be made in accordance with the set-
tior's probable intention.
Historically, courts have most often applied the equitable deviation
doctrine in the context of charitable trusts.234 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts took the position that the deviation doctrine allowed a
court to make changes in the administration of a charitable trust.23 5
According to the Restatement, courts would utilize the cy pres doctrine
to determine "the extent to which the court will permit or direct the
trustee to apply the trust property to charitable purposes other than
232. Arizona omitted UTC section 411(c) from its version of the UTC, suggesting that
Arizona was not persuaded by the UTC drafters' argument in support of UTC
section 411(c).
233. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3838(a) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
234. In that context courts have sometimes shown confusion about the relation of the
equitable deviation doctrine and the cy pres doctrine. Report of Committee on
Charitable Trusts and Foundations, Cy Pres and Deviation: Current Trends in
Application, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 391, 399 (1973) (pointing out the confu-
sion and noting that the line between cy pres and deviation is "sometimes difficult
to perceive and that there is a gray area in which application of either doctrine is
justifiable").
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381, cmt. a (1959).
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the particular charitable purpose designated by the settlor... ,"236 In
the context of noncharitable private express trusts, the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts adopted the position that the doctrine of equitable
deviation applied only to administrative provisions of a trust.23 7 Prior
to the enactment of UTC section 412(a), Nebraska recognized the
availability of the doctrine of equitable deviation to make changes to
administrative provisions in charitable trusts.2 38 Although there is no
reported Nebraska case law applying the doctrine of equitable devia-
tion to modify administrative provisions of a noncharitable private ex-
press trust, it seems likely Nebraska would have followed the position
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. However, prior to the enact-
ment of UTC section 412(a), there was neither case law nor statutory
authority for a Nebraska court to modify a dispositive provision of a
private express trust.
In contrast to the position taken in the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts extends the doctrine of equi-
table deviation to matters affecting the dispositive as well as the ad-
ministrative provisions of a trust.2 39 UTC section 412(a) reflects the
position taken by the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. Although the
Comment to UTC section 412 states that Section 412 "broadens the
court's ability to apply equitable deviation to terminate or modify a
trust,"2 60 in fact UTC section 412(a) clearly changes Nebraska law.
Should UTC section 412(a) apply retroactively? To the extent that
UTC section 412(a) authorizes application of the doctrine of equitable
deviation to administrative provisions of a trust, the section does no
more than codify what was already Nebraska law, so retroactive appli-
236. Id.; see also Report of Committee on Charitable Trusts and Foundations, supra
note 234, at 398-99 ("It has been broadly stated that the deviation doctrine is
applicable to make changes in the manner in which a charitable trust is adminis-
tered while cy pres is used in cases where a change of the settlor's specific chari-
table purpose is involved") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381, cmt. a
(1959)).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167(1) cmt., illus. 1-16 (1959). "The com-
mentary to Restatement Second, Trusts § 167... and its Illustrations, as well as
the distinct weight of case authorities . . . , make clear that this prior section
applies only to administrative provisions." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66,
at 177 (Tentative. Draft. No. 3 2001) (emphasis in original) (Reporters Notes on
§ 66, cmt. a).
238. See, e.g., In re R. B. Plummer Memorial Loan Fund Trust, 266 Neb. 1, 661
N.W.2d 307 (2003); In re Last Will and Testament of Teeters, 205 Neb. 576, 288
N.W.2d 735 (1980).
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) (Tentative Draft. No. 3 2001) provides:
"(1) The court may modify an administrative or distributive provision of a trust,
or direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an administrative or distributive
provision, if because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the modifica-
tion or deviation will further the purposes of the trust."
240. Comment, UTC § 412 (emphasis added).
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cation in that context raises no constitutional or policy issues. 24 1 To
the extent that UTC section 412(a) authorizes application of the doc-
trine of equitable deviation to dispositive provisions of a trust, the sec-
tion changes Nebraska law and should not be applied to trusts that
were or became irrevocable prior to the operative date of the Nebraska
UTC. Such a position finds support in the fact that the settlor pre-
sumably would have understood that, under the law applicable at the
time the trust became irrevocable, a court could not change dispositive
provisions in. the manner authorized by UTC section 412(a).
Admittedly, applying UTC section 412(a) retroactively has some
appeal. UTC section 412(a) allows modification of dispositive terms
only if modification is required "because of circumstances not antici-
pated by the settlor" and then only if the "modification ... will further
the purposes of the trust." UTC section 412(a) also provides that "[tlo
the extent practicable, the modification must be made in accordance
with the settlor's probable intention." With these safeguards, objec-
tions to retroactive application of UTC section 412(a) might seem to
diminish because UTC section 412(a), especially if application of that
provision would provide a solution to an otherwise difficult problem.
Consider the following Illustration from the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts:242
H and W executed revocable trusts at the same time pursuant to a common
(although not contractual) plan under which the trust of the first of them to
die would continue for the other; under that common plan, both trust remain-
ders would eventually pass to the issue of H and W. Accordingly, upon W's
death a number of years ago, T became her successor trustee, with instruc-
tions to pay H all of the income plus such amounts of trust principal as T
deems necessary to enable H to maintain his accustomed standard of living;
upon H's death, the trust remainder is to pass (as are H's own probate and
trust assets) by right of representation to the issue of H and W. Subsequent to
W's death, H has become legally incapacitated and is unable to enjoy or man-
age the substantial amount of unneeded income that is being distributed to
him; he is, however, expected to survive for a considerable period of time. The
income from W's trust and from H's personal estate, together with his sub-
stantial pension, are more than sufficient to provide for H's foreseeable needs
and comfort over the rest of his lifetime. There is no evidence that W antici-
pated the present situation, and there are no estate-planning objectives (such
as the federal estate tax marital deduction) that would require continued pay-
ment of the trust income to H. The court may direct T to cease paying the
trust income to H and to accumulate it for eventual distribution to the remain-
der beneficiaries, unless and until H's circumstances again change. The re-
241. The Kansas Supreme Court has applied UTC section 412(a) [K.S.A. § 58a-412
(Supp. 2002)] retroactively to modify an administrative provision of a testamen-
tary trust established in 1969, in a proceeding commenced on May 23, 2002. The
Kansas UTC became effective January 1, 2003. In the Matter of John P. Harris
Testamentary Trust, 69 P.3d 1109, 1117-1118 (Kan. 2003).
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66, illus. 3 (Tentative Draft. No. 3 2001). The
Comment to UTC section 412 specifically refers to the Illustrations under Section
66 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Tent. Draft No. 3 March 5, 2001).
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sult of such a modification will be to avoid conservatorship expenses and will
be consistent with and advantageous to W's (and also H's) underlying plan
eventually to benefit the remainder beneficiaries.
If we assume that the trust described in this Illustration had become
irrevocable before the operative date of the UTC, retroactive applica-
tion of UTC section 412(a) might seem appropriate even though a ben-
eficial interest shifts from H to the remainder beneficiaries. And a
court might reach this result under its constitutional equity jurisdic-
tion, relying on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
Of course, the preceding Illustration represents a relatively easy
case. Suppose Settlor created an irrevocable trust in 1985 and died in
1990. The trust provides that the two children of Settlor are to receive
income from the trust for life, with the remainder to pass to Settlor's
grandchildren after the death of the second child. In 2006, after the
operative date of the Nebraska UTC, one child is involved in a serious
automobile accident that leaves the child totally disabled and without
any significant assets. The other child is healthy, employed, and has
sufficient assets to and income to live comfortably. There is no evi-
dence that Settlor ever anticipated such a problem. If the trustee
sought a court order authorizing diversion of all of the trust income to
the injured child and authorizing invasion of trust corpus for the bene-
fit of the injured child, should the court apply UTC section 412(a) to
issue such an order? Such an order would change beneficial interests
in the trust, taking both from one income beneficiary and from the
remainder beneficiaries. This example, not the Illustration from the
Restatement, demonstrates the need to refuse to apply UTC section
412(a) retroactively.
Finally, note that UTC section 412(b) "broadens the court's ability
to modify the administrative terms of a trust."243 UTC section 412(b)
provides: "The court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if
continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be impractical or
wasteful or impair the trust's administration." Although this provi-
sion changes Nebraska law, it does so in connection with administra-
tive provisions, which are currently subject to the equitable deviation
doctrine. Thus there should be no constitutional or policy objection to
retroactive application of UTC section 412(b).
E. Cy Pres
UTC section 413244 introduces two new rules in Nebraska law
which should not be applied retroactively to charitable trusts created
before the operative date of the Nebraska UTC. UTC 413(a) "modifies
the doctrine of cy pres by presuming that the settlor had a general
243. Comment, UJTC § 412.
244. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3839 (Sup~p. 2003).
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charitable intent when a particular charitable purpose becomes im-
possible or impracticable to achieve."2 45 Nebraska law has previously
required a general charitable intent as a precondition to the exercise
of the court's cy pres power.24 6 The new rule of UTC section 413(a)
should not be applied retroactively to establish different beneficial in-
terests in the trust than existed prior to enactment of the UTC.
UTC section 413(b) limits the power of the court to enforce a gift
over to a noncharitable beneficiary pursuant to a provision in the
terms of a charitable trust unless the property is to revert to a living
settlor or fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the trust was cre-
ated.24 7 UTC section 413(b)'s application seems constitutionally sus-
pect (1) to the extent it may retroactively establish different beneficial
interests in the trust than existed prior to enactment of the UTC,248
and (2) to the extent it may encroach on the constitutional equity ju-
risdiction of Nebraska courts.
F. Discretionary Distributions of a Trustee-Beneficiary
UTC section 814(b)(1) establishes a "rule of construction" that "re-
write[s] the terms of a trust that might otherwise result in adverse
245. Comment, UTC § 413 ("Courts are usually able to find a general charitable pur-
pose to which to apply the property, no matter how vaguely such purpose may
have been expressed by the settlor.").
246. Report, supra note 3, at 131 (quoting In re Last Will and Testament of Teeters,
205 Neb. 735, 288 N.W.2d 735 (1980)); see also In re Plummer Memorial Loan
Fund Trust, 266 Neb. 1, 7, 661 NW2d 307, 312 (2003) ("The doctrine of cy pres is
a principle of construction based on a judicial finding of the donor's intention as
applied to new conditions. The doctrine will not be applied if the donor indicates
the gift shall be used for a narrow specific purpose because that would defeat the
purpose of the donor. But where the specific purpose recited cannot be accom-
plished because of changed conditions, and a more general charitable purpose is
shown by the will, the cy pres doctrine may be resorted to, not to defeat the do-
nor's intention, but to effectuate it.") (citations omitted).
247. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3839(b) (Supp. 2003). The rationale of this provision is:
Responding to concerns about the clogging of title and other administra-
tive problems caused by remote default provisions upon the failure of a
charitable purpose, subsection (b) invalidates a gift over to a noncharita-
ble beneficiary upon a failure of a particular charitable purpose unless
the property is to revert to a living settlor or fewer than 21 years have
elapsed since the trust's creation.
Comment, U3TC § 413. This provision does not affect a charitable lead trust since
cy pres does not apply ("the settlor's particular purpose has instead been
fulfilled").
248. The current draft of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts also expresses apparent
concern as to the retroactive implications. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS,
§ 67 (2003) (Reporter's Notes on § 67, cmt. b: "On the possibility of retrospective
application of the 21-year rule to pre-existing future interests, see U3TC § 1106,
together with its Comment that, except as otherwise restricted, the Code 'is in-
tended to have the widest possible effect within constitutional limitations.'").
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estate and gift tax consequences to a beneficiary-trustee" 249 by trans-
forming what would otherwise be a general power of appointment for
federal estate and gift tax purposes into a special power of appoint-
ment. 250 UTC section 814(b) provides that "[slubject to subsection (d),
and unless the terms of the trust expressly indicate that a rule in this
subsection does not apply:"25 1
(1) a person other than a settlor who is a beneficiary and trustee of a trust
that confers on the trustee a power to make discretionary distributions to or
for the trustee's personal benefit may exercise the power only in accordance
with an ascertainable standard relating to the trustee's individual health, ed-
ucation, support or maintenance within the meaning of Section
2041(b)(1)(A)2 5 2 or 2514(c)(1) 2 5 3 of the Internal Revenue Code ....
249. Comment, UTC § 814 ("[T]he unintended inclusion of the trust in the beneficiary-
trustee's gross estate is a frequent enough occurrence that the drafters concluded
that it is a topic that this Code should address. It is also a topic on which numer-
ous States have enacted corrective statutes.").
250. Kansas, the first state to adopt the UTC, did not include this curative provision in
the Kansas UTC. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-814 (Supp. 2002). The Kansas UTC
became effective on January 1, 2003. In a case commenced before that date, In re
John P. Harris Testamentary Trust, 69 P.3d 1109 (Kan. 2003), the Kansas Su-
preme Court, after concluding under UTC section 1106(a)(3) [KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58a-1106(a)(3) (Supp. 2002)] that the Kansas UTC applied to case, noted that
the curative provision omitted from KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-814 would have elimi-
nated one of the problems that the trustees of the trust sought to remedy. 69
P.3d at 1117. Fortunately, the Kansas Supreme Court also concluded that UTC
§ 415 [KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-415 (Supp. 2002)] authorized reformation of the
trust to impose an ascertainable standard on all holders of a power of appoint-
ment over the corpus of the trust, thus making all such powers special (non-gen-
eral) powers of appointment for estate and gift tax purposes. 69 P.2d at 1117.
The Kansas Supreme Court opined in dicta that the power to modify in UTC
§ 416 [KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-416 (Supp. 2002)] would support this same result.
69 P.3d at 1117.
251. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3879(b) (Supp. 2003). Subsection (d) excludes marital de-
duction trusts, trusts revocable by the settlor, and present interest annual exclu-
sion trusts under I.R.C. § 2503(c). Subsection (a) codifies current Nebraska law
that grants of "absolute," "sole," or "uncontrolled" discretion to a trustee require
the power to be exercised for the purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries. See, e.g., In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
252. I.R.C. Section 2041(b)(1)(A) provides:
(1) GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The term "general power of ap-
pointment" means a power that is exercisable in favor of the decedent,
his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate, except that -
(A) A power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the bene-
fit of the decedent which is limited by an ascertainable standard relating
to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent shall
not be deemed a general power of appointment.
253. I.R.C. Section 2514(c)(1) provides:
(c) DEFINITION OF GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT. For purposes of this
section, the term "general power of appointment" means a power that is
exercisable in favor of the person possessing the power (hereafter in this
subsection referred to as the "possessor"), his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate; except that -
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The Comment to UTC section 814 explains that "the power to make
discretionary distributions to a beneficiary-trustee is automatically
limited by the requisite ascertainable standard necessary to avoid in-
clusion of the trust in the trustee's gross estate or result in a taxable
gift upon the trustee's release or exercise of the power."2 54 The "rule
of construction" in UTC section 814(b)(1) is in addition to UTC section
416, which authorizes a court to modify the terms of a trust to
"achieve the settlor's tax objectives."2 55
Elimination of a "presently exercisable general power of appoint-
ment" also has significant consequences in the administration of the
trust. The power is no longer within the UTC definition of "power of
withdrawal,"2 56 which means that the trustee-beneficiary does not
have the rights of a settlor of a revocable trust 2 57 and other rights
with respect to the trust.258 It also means that creditors of the trus-
tee-beneficiary will not have recourse to some or all of the trust prop-
erty. 2 5 9 Standing alone, it additionally reduces the power of the
trustee-beneficiary more than is necessary to achieve the estate and
gift tax results. A trustee-beneficiary could have a power to appoint to
others than himself, his creditors, his estate, or creditors of his estate
without adverse tax consequences. 2 60 UTC section 814(c) gives some
potential relief to the beneficial interest of a trustee-beneficiary by
providing that a power whose exercise is limited by UTC section
814(b) may be exercised by a majority of the remaining unaffected
trustees or a court may appoint a special fiduciary to exercise the
power. 26 1
It is doubtful whether UTC section 814(b)(1) would achieve its in-
tended tax consequences with respect to preexisting irrevocable
trusts. The state property interests to which federal estate and gift
tax consequences attach would previously have been established
(1) A power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the bene-
fit of the possessor which is limited by an ascertainable standard relat-
ing to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the possessor
shall not be deemed a general power of appointment.
254. Comment, UTC § 814(b)(1). Additionally, there might be income tax conse-
quences to the extent that the trust property exceeds the portion of the trust
attributable to the ascertainable standard. See I.R.C. § 678(a)(1) ("A person other
than the grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust with
respect to which: (1) such person has a power exercisable solely by himself to vest
the corpus or the income therefrom in himself.").
255. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3842 (Supp. 2003). The court order may have "retroactive
effect" and must modify the terms of the trust "in a manner that it not contrary to
the settlor's probable intent."
256. UTC § 103(10); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2803(10) (Supp. 2003).
257. UTC § 603(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3855(c) (Supp. 2003).
258. See Comment, UTC § 401; and Report, supra note 3, at 20.
259. See UTC § 505(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3850(b) (Supp. 2003).
260. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(c)(1)(b), 25.2514-1(c)(1)(b).
261. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3879(c) (Supp. 2003).
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under then applicable state law. While the savings provisions of UTC
section 814(b)(1) can apply from the outset to interests established af-
ter the enactment of the UTC, they are probably ineffective to rescue
powers of a trustee-beneficiary previously existing under an irrevoca-
ble trust. If UTC section 814(b)(1) does apply to a previously existing
power that was a general power of appointment under the Internal
Revenue Code, the federal tax effect probably would be characterized
as a lapse, exercise or release of the power with gift and estate tax
consequences. 26 2
UTC section 814(b)(1) should not be applied to preexisting irrevo-
cable trusts. In changing beneficial interests in the trust, it falls
within the constitutional limitations which "preclude retroactive ap-
plication of rules of construction to alter property rights under trusts
that became irrevocable prior to the effective date."26 3
The change in beneficial interests under UTC section 814(b)(1) oc-
curs "unless the terms of the trust expressly indicate" that the rule
should not apply. "Terms of a trust" include both the "trust instru-
ment" and "other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial pro-
ceeding."26 4 The language "expressly indicate" is impossible to define
with precision.2 65 But certainly beneficial interests which have been
irrevocably created and have existed for a period of time before enact-
ment of the UTC would constitute "terms of the trust which indicate"
that the rule of UTC section 814(b)(1) does not apply.
VIII. NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL EQUITY JURISDICTION
UTC section 106 states that "[t]he common law of trusts and prin-
ciples of equity supplement this [Code], except to the extent modified
by this [Code] or another statute of this State."2 66 In Nebraska, how-
ever, the reverse may be true in some situations. The judicial consti-
tutional equity jurisdiction exists independently of statutes. The
Nebraska UTC may supplement the broad Nebraska constitutional
equity jurisdiction of district courts.
The Comment to UTC section 106 states: "The common law of
trusts is not static but includes the contemporary and evolving rules of
decision developed by the courts in exercise of their power to adapt the
law to new situations and changing conditions. It also includes the
traditional and broad equitable jurisdiction of the court, which the
Code in no way restricts." UTC section 105(b)(13) provides: "The
terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this [Code] except. . . the
262. See I.R.C. § § 2041(a)(2) & (b)(2), 2514(b) & (e).
263. Comment, UTC § 1106.
264. UTC § 103(17); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3803(18).
265. See text supra accompanying notes 122 through 129.
266. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3806 (Supp. 2003).
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power of the court to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction as
may be necessary in the interests of justice."267
Article V, Section 9, of the Nebraska Constitution provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have both chancery and common law juris-
diction, and such other jurisdiction as the Legislature may provide
.... "268 There is a body of law that the Nebraska constitutional eq-
uity jurisdiction of district courts "cannot be legislatively limited or
controlled." 26 9 This jurisdiction extends to private2 70 and charita-
ble2 71 trusts. The Legislature can provide county courts with equity
powers, 272 but it cannot limit the equity jurisdiction of district courts.
Provisions of the UTC which may limit the constitutional equity juris-
diction of Nebraska district courts or legislatively overrule decisions
defining beneficial rights and interests in trusts may conflict with Ar-
ticle V, Section 9. The UTC provisions on claims of certain judgment
creditors against spendthrift and discretionary trusts, for example,
267. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(13) (Supp. 2003). UTC section 105(b)(14) adds that
the terms of the trust do not prevail over "the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court." NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(14) (Supp. 2003).
268. Neb. Const. art. V, § 9.
269. See, e.g., Stoneman v. United Neb. Bank, 254 Neb. 477, 487, 577 N.W.2d 271, 279
(1998); K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Scottsbluff, 233 Neb. 644, 653, 447 N.W.2d
227, 234 (1989); In re Estate of Steppuhn, 221 Neb. 329, 332, 377 N.W.2d 83, 85
(1985); Omaha Fish and Wildlife Club v. Cmty Refuse, 208 Neb. 110, 112, 302
N.W.2d 379, 380 (1981); Village of Springfield v. Hevelone, 195 Neb. 37, 39, 236
N.W.2d 811, 813-14 (1975).
270. See, e.g., Burnham v. Bennison:
It may be said that, by the terms of the Constitution, district courts in
Nebraska are vested with "chancery and common law jurisdiction."
Const. art. 5, § 9. This we have construed as vesting district courts with
equity jurisdiction which they may exercise without legislative enact-
ment. Indeed, this court is committed to the view that, not only is equity
jurisdiction conferred by the terms of the Constitution, but as thus con-
ferred it is beyond the power of the legislature to limit or control. That,
while the legislature may grant such other jurisdiction as it may deem
proper, it cannot limit or take away from such courts their broad and
general jurisdiction which the Constitution has conferred upon them.
One of the well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction thus conferred
on, and available in, courts of this state, by virtue of this constitutional
provision, is the supervision of the administration of trusts.
121 Neb. 291, 298, 236 N.W. 745, 748 (1931) (citations omitted).
271. See, e.g., John A. Creighton Home for Poor Working Girls' Trust v. Waltman, 140
Neb. 3, 9-10, 299 N.W. 261, 265-66 (1941) (after quoting the language from Burn-
ham v. Bennison set out in the immediately preceding footnote, the Court stated:
"It necessarily follows that the district court for Douglas County has jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the property in this trust. It has for years been exer-
cising that jurisdiction in the administration of this trust. It has the power and
the duty to continue to do so. The statutes cited are not controlling.").
272. See, e.g., Kentopp v. Kentopp, 206 Neb. 776, 295 N.W.2d 275 (1980) (recognizing
that Nebraska county courts have equity jurisdiction in matters relating to the
administration and settlement of decedents' estates under the Nebraska Uniform
Probate Code).
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may be subject to this constitutional limitation as applied
retroactively. 2 73
County courts and district courts have concurrent original jurisdic-
tion under the Nebraska UTC.274 The Nebraska UTC also states that
"[tlo the full extent permitted by the Constitution of Nebraska, the
county court has jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to
trusts."275 County courts, however, do not have general equitable ju-
risdiction under the Nebraska Constitution. They possess equity ju-
risdiction only by virtue of legislative authority. 276 In view of the
clear unlimited constitutional equity jurisdiction of district courts, dis-
trict courts may provide a more advantageous venue than county
courts to litigate issues involving the inherent judicial authority of Ar-
ticle V, Section 9, with respect to trusts.
UTC section 413, for example, contains limitations on court en-
forcement of the terms of a charitable trust for distribution to non-
charitable beneficiaries upon a failure of a charitable purpose which
change prior Nebraska Supreme Court holdings.277 It seems likely
that district courts continue to have general equity jurisdiction under
the Nebraska Constitution to decide the litigation apart from the pro-
visions of the Nebraska UTC, which a county court probably does not
have. A district court might thereby avoid ruling on the applicability
of UTC section 413 to preexisting charitable trusts and base its deci-
sion upon independent constitutional equity jurisdiction.2 78
IX. NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Article V, Section 2 of the Nebraska Constitution requires that
"[t]he judges of the Supreme Court, sitting without division, shall hear
and determine all cases involving the constitutionality of a statute"
and that "[n]o legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by
the concurrence of five judges."2 79 The statutes provide that "cases
273. For a further discussion of the spendthrift provisions, see discussion supra sec-
tion VII.A.
274. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-517(8) (Supp. 2003).
275. Id. § 30-3814(a). This Nebraska section replaced UTC section 203. See Nebraska
Comments on UTC § 203, Report, supra note 3, at 61-62.
276. See In re Adoption of Hemmer, 260 Neb. 827, 619 N.W.2d 848 (2000); Scherbak v.
Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510 N.W.2d 318 (1994); lodence v. Potmesil, 239 Neb. 387,
476 N.W.2d 554 (1991); Miller v. Janecek, 210 Neb. 316, 314 N.W.2d 250 (1982);
In re Estate of Layton, 207 Neb. 646, 300 N.W.2d 802 (1981); Kentopp v.
Kentopp, 206 Neb. 776, 295 N.W.2d 275 (1980).
277. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3839 (Supp. 2003).
278. Similarly, the applicability of equitable deviation rules to a preexisting private
irrevocable trust might be resolved under the court's independent equity jurisdic-
tion rather than under UTC section 412(a). See text beginning supra at note 233.
279. Neb. Const. art. V, § 2.
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involving the constitutionality of a statute" are appealable directly to
the Supreme Court. 28 0 Additionally, the statutes allow the Supreme
Court to grant direct review when "the case involves a question of
state or federal constitutional interpretation,"28 and when "the case
raises a question of law regarding the validity of a statute."28 2
County courts have concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in
matters arising under the Nebraska UTC.283 Appeals from county
court decisions under the Nebraska UTC are taken in the same man-
ner as an appeal from a district court decision. 28 4 The Rules of Prac-
tice state that a notice of appeal "shall be deemed made to the Court of
Appeals unless the notice contains language specifically requesting
appeal to the Supreme Court along with the citation to the statutory
authority allowing such appeal to the Supreme Court."28 5 If the ap-
peal is to the Supreme Court, the clerk of a district or county court is
required to send a certificate containing, among other things, a state-
ment that "the appeal involves . . . constitutionality of a statute."28 6
The Rules of Practice also require that a party presenting "a case in-
volving the federal or state constitutionality of a statute" must file and
serve a separate written notice thereof with the Supreme Court Clerk
at the time of filing its brief and, if the Attorney General is not a party
to the litigation, serve a copy of the brief on the Attorney General.287
It is essential that the constitutional issue be raised in the trial court
and that the Rules of Practice relating to constitutional issues be
strictly complied with.28 8 The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdic-
tion to hold a statute unconstitutional.289
UTC section 1106(a)(1) applies the UTC categorically to "all trusts
created before ... [its effective date]."290 The UTC leaves to interpre-
tation, application, and potential litigation whether its provisions can
constitutionally be applied to each preexisting trust. There are no Ne-
280. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1106(1) (Reissue 1995).
281. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1106(2)(b) (Reissue 1995).
282. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1106(2)(c) (Reissue 1995).
283. NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-517(8) (Supp. 2003).
284. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1601(1) (Supp. 2003). District courts do not have appellate
jurisdiction with respect to county court matters arising under the Nebraska
UTC. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1901, 25-2728(2)(d) (Supp. 2003).
285. NEBR. CT. R. OF PRAC. 1B(1) (June 2003).
286. NEBR. CT. R. OF PRAc. Rule 1(B)(5)d (June 2003). The sample Clerk's Certificates
contain "check the box" spaces for the court to which the appeal is directed and, if
the appeal is to the Supreme Court, that the constitutionality of a statute is in-
volved. Id. App. 2 and App. 5.
287. NEBR. CT. R. OF PRAc. Rule 9E (June 2003).
288. See Zoucha v. Henn, 258 Neb. 611, 614-615, 604 N.W.2d 828, 831 (2000).
289. See Metro Renovation, Inc. v. State, 249 Neb. 337, 345, 543 N.W.2d 715, 721
(1996) ("Since the Court of Appeals lacks the authority to declare a statute uncon-
stitutional, any discussion by that court of the constitutionality of a statute would
be dicta at best.").
290. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,110(a)(1) (Supp. 2003).
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braska Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Nebraska constitu-
tional language "involving the constitutionality of a statute" and "held
unconstitutional" as those provisions may affect litigation involving
the applicability of the UTC to preexisting trusts. Article V, Section 2,
may apply only to issues concerning the underlying constitutionality
of the UTC, such as whether a statutory provision is unconstitutional
"on its face." Article V, Section 2, can also be interpreted to cover a
broader category of cases alleging an unconstitutional application of
the UTC in a particular case or a category of circumstances. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court treated an argument that if the other side's
statutory interpretation was correct, the statute would violate the Ne-
braska and United States Constitutions, "as a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of these statutes."29 1
Even if the constitutional concern is merely a peripheral issue in
the matter, counsel for parties claiming a potential unconstitutional
application of a UTC provision to a preexisting trust would be well
advised to take a cautious procedural approach in order to preserve
the issue for an appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The ongoing
legislative study of the UTC292 prior to its operative date of January 1,
2005, should reconsider whether situations in which the applicability
of the UTC to preexisting trusts is likely to be determined by litigation
should be made applicable only to trusts which become irrevocable on
or after the operative date.29 3
X. CONCLUSION
NCCUSL faced a difficult task in aligning the "first national codifi-
cation of the law of trusts" with preexisting trusts and preexisting
trust law throughout the nation. It wisely chose to have one complete
trust code rather than two complete trust codes in existence in each
enacting state for a considerable period of time. The policy that the
UTC should "have the widest possible application, consistent with
constitutional limitations" was a reasonable general approach in fash-
ioning rules for the application of the new uniform law to existing re-
291. See Mid City Bank v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization, 260 Neb. 282, 291, 616
N.W.2d 341, 348 (2000) (deciding the case without reaching the constitutional
issue because there had not been compliance with Rule 9(E) requiring filing and
serving notice of the constitutional issue).
292. See L.R. 84, 98th Legis., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2003), Neb. Legis. J. 1537 (April 30,
2003).
293. For example, the pending Connecticut legislative bill contains special effective
date provisions for UTC section 505(a)(3) relating to claims by creditors of the
settlor of a revocable trust after the death of the settlor and of UTC sections
503(b) and 504(c) for support or maintenance judgment claims of a spouse or for-
mer spouse (but not child) against revocable and irrevocable spendthrift and dis-
cretionary trusts. 2003 Conn. Senate Bill No. 977, § 85(7)&(8) (introduced
February 25, 2003).
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lationships. But that concept, alone, is extremely vague and does not
give sufficient importance to the purposes and intentions of those who
established prior trusts and to the substantive legal principles then in
existence.
The drafters fell short in dealing with the potential lines to be
drawn with respect to beneficial interests in preexisting trusts. In the
development of the UTC over many years, the effect of UTC section
1106 on other provisions throughout the UTC does not appear to have
been given the intensive analysis that it deserved. Additional study is
warranted by states considering adoption of the UTC to determine
whether there should be further legislative refinement. Nebraska
omitted UTC section 112 changing the rules of construction for trusts
and would do well to repeal UTC section 1106(a)(4) on rules of con-
struction and presumptions prior to the Nebraska UTC becoming op-
erative on January 1, 2005. Nebraska should also reexamine the
question of whether UTC sections 411(c), 412(a), 413(a) and (b),
503(b), 504(c), and 814(b)(1) should apply to preexisting trusts. Al-
though they may'turn out to be few in number, important issues con-
cerning constitutional and other limitations on the application of the
UTC rules to preexisting trusts have been left to the parties, practi-
tioners and the courts. Finally, it would be helpful to reexamine the
question of whether the special spendthrift provision rule in UTC sec-
tion 411(c) is appropriate and if so whether that rule should also ap-
pear in UTC section 111.
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